A year ago, during the night of 13 to 14 April 2018, Washington, London and Paris launched Hamilton, an operation under French command to destroy Bashar al-Assad’s stock of chemical weapons. These punitive strikes deep into Syrian territory were in response to the regime’s attack against the civilian population in Douma on 7 April, which France, the United States and the United Kingdom had warned would not go unpunished. With Operation Hamilton France demonstrated its ability to enforce its red lines, and at the same time provided proof of its strategic autonomy, especially to Moscow which had had the military and diplomatic upper hand in the region since 2013.

From the military point of view, Hamilton was the outcome of complex work that resulted in the simultaneous firing of cruise missiles from the air and from sea.⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ The operation was a tactical success, since Syria no longer uses chemical weapons, and also a strategic victory, since this episode saw the return of the three nations to the power games being played out in Syria. It afforded the opportunity to explore the subtleties of a complex mission with overtones of a nuclear raid, and also the role of conventional weapons that might be considered to some degree strategic. Hamilton also underlined the importance of a modern, appropriately-sized Air Force.

Controlling risks and political decisions

Only an air raid would bring the guarantee of success to such a demonstration of power. France committed 20 aircraft to this night operation covering 10 hours and more than 7,000 km (4,350 miles). The combat aircraft made 3 in-flight refuellings before firing their cruise missiles from above international waters in the eastern Mediterranean, whilst the command and coordination of the three allies’ assets was conducted from two French AWACS C2 aircraft.⁽³⁾

Before ordering the operation, the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, needed assurance from the Air Force of the virtual certainty of success of the raid and a minimum risk of losses. For many this assurance was based upon historical knowhow gained from long-range air raids conducted by the air component of the nuclear deterrent and also on experience and expertise acquired from recent operations, as was also the case in Mali.⁽⁴⁾

The phase of flight up to firing, followed by the autonomous phase of the cruise missiles’ penetration of defences deep into Syrian territory, was the sole way of keeping control of the risks involved—minimum exposure of the pilots and low collateral damage—while affording a very strong probability of destruction of the targets.⁽⁵⁾ This mission profile, drawing on competences related to the nuclear deterrent role, was a demonstration of the progress made in the use of cruise missiles in conventional operations: similarities included the political dimension of missions, action far removed from national territory, personal presidential decision, reduced timescale for setting up the operation and the reversibility of action right up to the moment of firing.

Operation Hamilton is a reflection of the political will of the powers involved to conduct firm action without provoking escalation with Russia. There had been numerous prior warnings to the Syrian regime: whilst some diplomatic channels remain secret, there is little doubt that deconfliction mechanisms had been activated, since it was not in the interest of any of the protagonists to take another by surprise, thereby risking high-intensity combat.

Although it is understood that Russia was not too vehemently against the raid, it was expected that Moscow would show its ability to undermine the operation. The coalition also wanted to demonstrate its ability to act under all circumstances, including in defended airspace, by including air defence aircraft in the raid.⁽⁶⁾ As it turned out, there was no compromise of freedom of action by firings from Russian fighters or frigates.

To achieve penetration of the cruise missiles into Syria up to their targets meant thwarting the most modern of Russian anti-missile systems,⁽⁷⁾ since interception would have been especially bad for the image of the raid.⁽⁸⁾ Russia attempted a deception manoeuvre by announcing several interceptions, which merely emphasised the coalition’s ability for battle damage assessment and hence for contradicting the Russian claims. The actual use of anti-missile missiles remains uncertain: it was anyway not in Russia’s interest to defend against the raid too strongly for fear of inciting escalation with the three countries involved.⁽⁹⁾ The Russian reticence could also be construed as not wishing to expose the characteristics of its own systems—their true performance, as much as their failings.⁽¹⁰⁾

Strategic operations that participate in a complex dialogue of forces

By these long-distance strikes the coalition brought about a strategic rebalance to the detriment of Moscow without having to put its entire force structure into action. The demonstration by Paris, Washington and London of their independence of decision-making and action was simple application of power projection, of which few states are capable. It counterbalances the idea that Moscow’s unbridled use of force is effective in Syria. Beyond the destruction of the chemical weapon arsenal, Hamilton demonstrated that Western powers are capable of conducting a well-considered and controlled operation when certain red lines are crossed. That strategic message was addressed as much to Russia as to Syria.

Bringing that conflict into the logic of power play was a response to the need to re-establish the values of non-proliferation: weapons of mass destruction (WMD) cannot be used with impunity. These values are threatened for several reasons: they have been violated by Syria time and time again under the protection of a country—Russia—which has a special responsibility as a state possessing WMD and, moreover, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Besides that, the legitimacy of any action being political and ethical, use of force limited to surgical strikes contributed to its strategic nature, the ‘cleanliness’ of action itself sending a message of moral and technical superiority.⁽¹¹⁾ It clearly underlines the capability of those three powers to resort to military force, though in contrast to Damascus and Moscow they respect the laws of armed conflict and the lives of civilians when doing so.

There is of course the veiled message that nuclear deterrence was shaping this dialogue between nuclear powers. For France, it is in essence the only strategic domain. Deterrent logic is based on the fear of reprisals, and the airborne nuclear weapons are the visible part of deterrence.⁽¹²⁾ Yet conventional capabilities that ally firepower, precision, autonomy, reactivity and range to some degree equally contribute to strategic action ⁽¹³⁾ and are priority matters for an ambitious power such as France.⁽¹⁴⁾

Cruise missiles are the state of the art in conventional strikes and their use in Hamilton should be seen in the light of their repeated use by Russia in the Syrian theatre, fired from its frigates and submarines. It is worthy of note that real operations and exercises that show off missiles potentially capable of carrying nuclear warheads have a particular significance for Moscow: those firings of the conventional version of Kalibr contribute to the credibility of Russian nuclear capabilities. It is therefore quite likely that the coalition raid was perceived by Moscow as a demonstration of the capacity of Paris, London and Washington to conduct a strategic operation technically comparable to a nuclear mission.

French air power beyond Hamilton

While the action of France in Syria is a reminder of the central position of air power in application of strategic independence,⁽¹⁵⁾ its lessons should also serve to identify the challenges facing French air power. In a global context where strategies and tactics of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)⁽¹⁶⁾ have again become major concerns, two scenarios suggested in the review Revue stratégique in 2017⁽¹⁷⁾ add to consideration of highest intensity crises in which activation of defences is able to constrain our freedom of action.

Credibility of our capability to recover territory of a NATO member annexed by Russia⁽¹⁸⁾

Politically, this scenario is a test of the principle of solidarity of NATO’s Article 5 when faced by the only enemy capable of countering a latest-generation, effective A2/D2 structure. Strategically, one of the prime objectives of the belligerents would be to contain the conflict to the regional level and keep it below the nuclear threshold. That said, NATO would have to avoid the danger of self-censure through fear of escalation even when faced with a Russia that would probably not hesitate to communicate somewhat skilfully its tactical nuclear potential to intimidate the allies and thus deter them from reacting to the annexing of the territory.

Such a recovery operation would probably start with a big air campaign commanded by the United States. Although imposing on a European scale, the contribution of French air forces to this high-intensity combat is unlikely to be significant in overall size nor would it be decisive. Whilst A2/AD does not represent a solid barrier for France, the conventional capability of the Air Force would highlight its limitations.⁽¹⁹⁾

In a case where the scenario moves towards escalation of the conflict, France would probably envisage concentrating its air assets onto the home-based deterrent function because it does not possess the critical size to affirm its autonomy in any way other than to consider the re-establishment of deterrence as a means of stabilisation or setting an upper limit to the escalation.

This scenario militates for strengthening our air forces. It underlines that in a highly demanding campaign we have to have available sufficient resources to ensure our solidarity in the long term. The challenge would be to preserve the credibility of the national deterrent, both independently and as a contribution to NATO’s deterrence.

Ability to conduct conventional reprisals of a strategic nature
against a threatening medium-sized state (or a proxy)

If France were threatened unacceptably, or even attacked, by a state possessing modern offensive and defensive missiles ⁽²⁰⁾ there would be more uncertainty about the outcome of the confrontation than about the decisive character of the demonstration of power of which we would be capable. The adversary would test our determination in the face of a considerable risk of losses and the probability of lesser success than in operation Hamilton.

An autonomous and potentially long air campaign in an average A2/AD environment ⁽²¹⁾ would be a challenge. In the first place, AD air defences would have to be neutralised according to the modes tested in Syria, though on a larger scale. The size of the air force and stock of ammunition would directly affect the strength of our reaction.

Just as Hamilton demonstrated our capability to accomplish conventional missions in fulfilling a strategic function, France would seek to keep well away from nuclear matters even in the case of a missile reaching its territory and which might wrongly be seen as a failure of deterrence.⁽²²⁾ Our limited anti-missile defence capacity ^(23)(24) could therefore increase in importance in the face of proliferation of increasingly effective ballistic and cruise missiles. It would allow for local protection of certain sites and, on occasion, provide options to guard against unfounded doubts about our deterrence.⁽²⁵⁾

This scenario could in the medium term become a revelation of France’s strategic autonomy and serve at the very least to define the size of our air and anti-missile capabilities. An insufficiently significant demonstration of power, an even moderate level of losses in its conduct, or a resort to the nuclear question would all amount to victories for the adversary.

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• Hamilton shows that when facing A2/AD the pairing of combat aircraft + cruise missile confers a strategic dimension on air power and justifies political decisions in favour of these modes of action, especially for a demonstration of force. In the medium term, the increasing capability of numerous players supports this trend.

• The concepts and tactics that the Strategic air forces (Forces aériennes stratégiques—FAS) bring to the conventional forces underline the importance of deterrence in stimulating innovation. It is also the proof that certain closed areas are evolving. The strategic aspects of the conventional arms race are accentuating this movement.

• Faced with the challenges of dissemination, notably of anti-air defence systems, exceptional technical knowledge such as in the field of hypersonic missiles should continue to be developed because it will shape the dialogue of power. Cyber matters, space, offensive and defensive electronic warfare and, in the medium term, artificial intelligence, are all areas of innovation of capital importance to air operations in an A2/AD environment.

• Faced equally with modern defences, the quantitative reduction favouring the qualitative increase that high-performance, though increasingly expensive combat aircraft offer cannot be the sole solution. The critical size that corresponds to military ambition, particularly in initial entry air capability, must be supported precisely by simulation. It is not contradictory to promote more rudimentary vehicles and complementary modes of operation in scenarios where the cost of high-tech weapons would be prohibitive.

• The sovereign nature of a demonstration of power is compatible to some extent with a European dimension, as much to gain legitimacy of action as to boost the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) for missiles. We need to add to our consideration of cooperation on key capabilities that would not weaken our national sovereignty in operations, examples being space exploration and the Future combat air system (FCAS, Système de combat aérien du futur—SCAF).

• The proliferation of offensive missiles opens up opportunities for adversaries who find themselves faced with ineffective anti-missile defences.⁽²⁶⁾ The effect on public opinion of a missile landing on France would certainly be prejudicial to deterrence. The NATO pattern of deterrence and defence, based on an appropriate combination of conventional, nuclear and anti-missile defence capabilities ⁽²⁷⁾ would merit adaptation to our national level particularly through reinvestment in anti-missile and anti-air defence, both doctrinally and in terms of capability. ♦

(1) Missiles capable of complete flight under power: performance depends on speed, range, manœuvring capability and accuracy.
(2) From Air Force Rafale (9 SCALP—long range conventional cruise missiles), US B-1B and British Tornado. From French Navy frigates (3 naval cruise missiles) and US cruisers and submarines.
(3) C2 air (air command and control) in flight and on the ground is the keystone to combined and joint integration (coordination of firing from the air and from sea).
(4) Despite similarity in modes of action Hamilton had nothing to do with nuclear matters.
(5) This first operational use of naval cruise missiles did not offer the same combat proven guarantees. The strength of the air organisation made the risk acceptable in order to demonstrate a full range of options.
(6) Air superiority was ensured by French Mirage 2000-5 and American F-15 and F-16.
(7) Preparation of missile trajectories was an essential tactic to counter systems like the Russian S-400 and S-300.
(8) France admitted several technical problems—1 SCALP and several naval cruise missiles not fired—though they did not prejudice the operation since the number of missiles planned covered the possibility of failure.
(9) The use of GPS jamming or some other form of EW is far more likely.
(10) The more so given that these systems attract the attention of the West and are particularly sought after (Iran, India and Turkey have already acquired them). Therein lie both strategic and commercial stakes.
(11) There is solid proof of the use of chemical weapons by Damascus. Nevertheless the operation was not backed up by a UN resolution, which would in any case have been vetoed by Russia.
(12) Affirmation of will, demonstrated credibility of capability and re-establishment of deterrence (concept here replacing that of final warning).
(12) It is acknowledged that the notion of conventional strategic capability in no way implies any possible substitution of nuclear deterrent capability, which remains the ultimate guarantee of security.
(14) Revue stratégique 2017, Article 297 (www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/politique-de-defense/revue-strategique/revue-strategique).
(15) The 2013 Livre blanc (Defence white paper) (https://fr.calameo.com/read/000331627d6f04ea4fe0e) and Revue Stratégique, op. cit., Article 275.
(16) For France, A2 and AD are two different postures, usable together to create a strategy. A2 works on the politico-strategic level through the use of long-range offensive systems that threaten the points of entry to a theatre and of long-range defensive systems that oblige air and naval assets to penetrate several layers to gain access. AD is of interest to the tactical level via offensive and defensive systems (which may be mobile and not evenly distributed) that are capable of hindering freedom of movement in all three environments within a theatre. It leaves open the possibility to conduct operations in defended areas if a variable level of risk is acceptable.
(17) Context relates to the resurgence of Russia or China and smaller regional powers that benefit from the proliferation of ever more effective missiles.
(18) A Ukraine-type scenario applied to NATO, which often serves as a hypothetical high-intensity example. Revue stratégique, op. cit., Article 140.
(19) See: National defence and armed forces committee, Hearing of General François Lecointre (Chef d’état-major des armées—CÉMA) on the draft finance law 2019, Assemblée nationale, 18 October 2018 (www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/cr-cdef/18-19/c1819015.asp).
(20) Revue stratégique, op. cit., Articles 140, 151 and 152.
(21) A few high-tech systems and a greater number of more basic ones positioned in layers.
(22) An expression often used in US and NATO writing but refuted by France, whose doctrine retains deliberate ambiguity on what might be considered failure of deterrence.
(23) Ten Mamba held by the Air Force: dual use systems effective in anti-air mode and against some missiles under some conditions.
(24) The concept of theatre anti-missile defence, hence deployed according to need (cf. NATO’s TBMD mission), which is different from permanent anti-ballistic missile defence (cf. NATO BMD).
(25) It is not realistic to promote an anti-missile shield, but defensive options can play a strategic role in a given theatre.
(26) Superiority of the most modern offensive missiles, and the possibility of saturation of defences with more rudimentary capabilities.
(27) This combination was mentioned in declarations from the 2012 Summit of Chicago, § 54 (www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en), through to that of the 2018 Summit of Brussels, § 34 (www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm?selectedLocale=en).