On 10 November 2001, Northern Alliance forces captured Mazar-i-Sharif, bringing about the collapse of the Taliban regime a month later. With this important victory, the first since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the whole world discovered pictures of western fighters on horseback amongst General Dostum’s cavalry. This indication of the involvement of Special Forces alongside the Northern Alliance, supported by coalition airpower would give birth a year later to the ‘Afghan Model’ concept, propounded and popularised by Stephen Biddle, researcher at the US Army War College.

What is the legacy of the Afghan model ten years on? Has it been relevant to other operational theatres? Is it still relevant in the framework of operations in Mali or of future conflicts?

To answer these questions, we have to go back to the beginnings of the model and its first implementation in Afghanistan, if we are to understand the basic principles. Study of recent conflicts reveals that the model was also used in northern Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, before reappearing in Libya during Operation Unified Protector. These three examples offer a precise definition of its characteristics, advantages and limitations. They confirm that the Afghan model is a strategic tool, mainly airborne, that is still completely relevant, with high coercive value when employed in the right conditions. It should be fully recognised and incorporated into our armed forces’ range of strategic options.

Birth of a concept: Afghanistan, October 2001 to March 2002

The beginnings of the Afghan model concept date from the first weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). After the 9/11 attacks, the National Security Council gave President Bush two options for Afghanistan. The first, fruit of the labours of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favoured the conventional approach requiring the deployment of five divisions over a period of several months before starting the assault on the Taliban regime. The second option, presented by the CIA, predicted the fall of the regime through the joint efforts of US airpower, Special Forces and Afghan allies. This option was not to the liking of the Pentagon military. It had too much of the flavour of unconvincing experiences during the Vietnam war, where Special Forces, allied with Montagnard tribes tried unsuccessfully to stem the flood of men and materiel along the Ho Chi Minh trail. For the Afghanistan issue, however, it caught the eye of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, for several reasons. Firstly, it offered a rapid response, in accordance with the expectations of the White House and of the American people, traumatised by the scale of the terrorist attacks. Isolated, with no access by sea, Afghanistan didn’t lend itself to massive troop deployments, requiring negotiations for transit and stationing with neighbouring states. The 1979 Soviet invasion, initiated from its Central Asian republics was not subject to the same restrictions. Next, the CIA plan was based on airpower, whose lethality and accuracy were far beyond anything available in Vietnam. Airpower, combined with Special Forces equipped with portable laser designators, and able to give exact GPS coordinates offered new possibilities that were still largely underestimated in 2001. Donald Rumsfeld glimpsed them, nonetheless. He initiated a major reform of the American military arm, considered too ponderous and unable to make enough use of its superior technology. ⁽¹⁾ The ‘Shock and Awe’ concept, developed in 1996 by researchers of the National Defence University had drawn the Defense Secretary’s attention: a combination of speed, accuracy and firepower that paralyses the enemy with a minimum of force. ⁽²⁾ Its first full-scale application later took place in Afghanistan, but with the ground element restricted to Special Forces.

The CIA plan was finally adopted, chiefly because of the geographic and diplomatic constraints of access to Afghanistan, and the political need to act quickly. The CIA could also make use of its solid relationship with the Northern Alliance, established in the months before 9/11. What followed is well known: the air campaign started on 7 October with an attack on the Taliban’s rudimentary air defence network and command and control infrastructure (C2). On 15 October, American Special Forces joined up with Northern Alliance forces to prepare the offensive against the main Taliban strongholds, particularly Mazar-i-Sharif. Without vehicles, they used the transport mode best adapted to the narrow trails of the Afghan mountains: the pony. The entrenched positions defending the town fell one after the other in the face of the joint action of coalition airpower and General Dostum’s fighters. The fall of Mazar-i-Sharif on 10 November marked the beginning of the end for the Taliban regime, which abandoned its last stronghold in Kandahar on 6 December after a campaign of just 60 days.

In November 2002 the first in-depth article on the new ‘Afghan Model’ appeared with Army War College researcher Stephen Biddle’s by-line. The author defined its chief characteristics—noting advantages and limitations—that had been demonstrated in the first months of the same year. The use of Afghan allies to ‘finish the job’ and liquidate the Al-Qaeda fighters who were dug in in Tora Bora or in the Shah-e-Kot valley (Operation Anaconda) did not meet with the hoped-for success. In the second case, the weak motivation of the Afghan soldiers who were supposed to unearth and push the enemy out of the valley, led to their retreat at the first sign of difficulty, leaving the US troops alone to face a determined enemy.

The application to Iraqi Kurdistan: March-April 2003

Whilst the first months of Enduring Freedom are fairly well documented in France, application of the Afghan model in northern Iraq in spring 2003 is far less so. Here again, geographic conditions and the diplomatic environment combined to oblige the Pentagon to reproduce the Afghan operational pattern. US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) planning for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein envisaged the deployment from Turkey of the 4^th Infantry Division (4 ID) into northern Iraq. By mid-March, in spite of intense diplomatic activity, CENTCOM was forced to recognise that Turkey would not join the coalition and would not authorise the opening of a northern front from its border. Somewhat in despair, General Tommy Franks decided to use special forces in order to tie down the 13 Iraqi divisions deployed by Saddam Hussein to cover his northern frontier. For CENTCOM the danger was to see these divisions redeployed to the south, opposite Kuwait, once the Iraqi dictator realised that the danger from Turkey had dissipated. CENTCOM then decided to commit 48 teams of 12 men from the 3^rd and 10^th Special Forces Group, supported by coalition airpower and infiltrated alongside the Kurdish Peshmergas, in an attempt to assume the role originally assigned to the 4 ID.

It was a difficult task: the 50,000 to 70,000 Kurdish militiamen were brave and motivated, but had no heavy equipment, and their offensive capability was non-existent. Their favourite tactic consisted of mounting costly frontal attacks on positions held by the 70,000 to 110,000 men of the Iraqi regular forces, and the 20,000 soldiers of the Republican Guard. The American Special Forces who constituted the Joint Special Operations Task-Force North (JSOTF-N) were infiltrated by air on 23 March without their vehicles and communications equipment, which were held up in Turkey. Air strike guidance therefore had to be conducted essentially by radio, without data links. Air support was also not up to Afghanistan standards: the coalition’s air resources were based in the Persian Gulf, a long way from northern Iraq. Without the planned Turkish bases, only naval aviation from carriers in the Mediterranean could be used, but that was also a long way away and limited in capability.

However the American Special Forces were able to accomplish the three missions assigned to them: to pin down the greater part of the Iraqi divisions on the Green Line (the border between Iraqi Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq), destroy the training camps of the terrorist group Ansar-al-Islam, and stabilise the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Spread out along the Green Line, in groups of 12 men plus a US Air Force combat air controller attached to a unit of 100 to 300 Peshmergas, the Special Forces used the local knowledge and intelligence of their Kurdish allies to direct air strikes on Iraqi units. During the 16 days of operations, Saddam Hussein’s troops never managed to sort the problem out. Airpower, effectively directed by the combat controllers made up for the numerical, material and tactical inferiority of the Kurdish allies.

Nonetheless, the successes of JSOTF-N were sometimes achieved with difficulty and at the cost of collateral damage. As with the fighting in the Debecka Pass, two American teams and their allies narrowly escaped annihilation at the hands of an Iraqi Motor Rifle company reinforced by a large number of tanks. Hindered by bad weather, American bombing led to the loss of 17 Kurdish combatants hit by mistake by an F-14 D fighter. The Special Forces owed their survival to their Javelin anti-tank missiles which pushed back the enemy armour. Fortunately an improvement in the weather the next day allowed them to finish off the Iraqi column. The JSOTF-N was also faced with another major problem: the lack of dedicated ISR capability (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), priority being given to covering the American advance from the south. The coalition lost all trace of the elite Nebuchadnezzar division, which managed to redeploy to central Iraq to confront the attack through the Karbala breach.

The Afghan model is not, therefore, risk-free. Even if its application in northern Iraq can be justly qualified as a coalition success, it also reveals the limitations, particularly with restricted air resources.

The Afghan Model, an antidote to bogging down in Libya

As the Iraqi example shows, the role of catalyst for airpower played by the American Special Forces demands a considerable ground element to be effective. The JSOTF-N consisted of no less than 600 men alongside the Kurdish Peshmergas. An operation on this scale is not within the capacities of the clandestine operations services alone, with their far fewer numbers. Hence the use of military special forces, too numerous to stay invisible, with the associated risks of fatalities, is not anodyne in political terms. Their activity requires a certain element of recognition by their government.

If this aspect posed no particular difficulty for the White House in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, it has been shown to be much more of a problem for France and Great Britain during Operation Unified Protector. Resolution 1971 of the UN Security Council authorised the use of ‘all measures necessary to protect populations and civilian areas threatened by attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, whilst excluding the deployment of any kind of foreign occupation force’. The types of measure necessary for this being left to the discretion of coalition members, the terms were sufficiently ambiguous to allow active support to the Libyan opposition. However, the exclusion of ground troops put the responsibility for support solely on the air and sea resources, with not much possibility of tight coordination with insurgent action.

Officially, therefore, the use of Special Forces in the first weeks was limited to the role of advisors to the CNT. But by late August, special forces from Qatar, the Emirates, and also from France and Great Britain were to be found along with the insurgents at the fall of Tripoli. Their role symptomizes a resort to the Afghan model, as described by Jean-Christophe Notin, where ‘the chain established by Special Operations Command did much to lubricate the observation/destruction process.’ ⁽³⁾ Why the change? Was it the result of coalition strategy from the beginning of Unified Protector, or of adaptation to the situation? Early studies of the campaign against Gaddafi lean towards the second hypothesis. Once the loyalist forces had been stopped short in their offensive against Benghazi, the coalition ran a risk of getting bogged down that was perceptible from the end of April. A study for the (French) Strategic Research Foundation carried out in this period already indicated the limitations of the insurrection, on its own incapable of forcing the enemy to concentrate and manoeuvre thereby offering a more vulnerable air target. The study also proposed the deployment of Special Forces Tactical Air Control Parties to increase the effectiveness of airstrikes. ⁽⁴⁾ With stagnation on the Brega and Misrata fronts, resort to the Afghan model seemed obvious also to the political authorities of the more resolute coalition states. It is also relevant to observe that despite the helicopter and fighter bomber attacks to free the coastal towns, the insurrection’s salvation came from the Jebel Nefoussa, where the Western and Arab special forces had been particularly active since spring 2011. Their role, alongside the Berber insurgents covered a wide spectrum, as explained in a study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) ⁽⁵⁾: supply of weapons and materiel by air and land, training insurgents for the assault on Tripoli, integration of the ground offensive with the NATO air campaign, and intelligence and airstrike guidance during combat.

Faced with the risk of bogging down, the coalition resorted to an escalation based on the Afghan model, using special forces, in order to counter the pro-Gaddafi forces’ adaptation to the operational methods of an air campaign insufficiently integrated with insurgent action. The Libyan example therefore confirms the intact relevance of the Afghan model 10 years after its birth. It shows also one of the paradoxes of airpower in the OUP situation: it gives satisfaction at the political level by affirming determination from the earliest moments of operations, without a ground commitment. However, it is only really effective in military terms if it integrates a ground element capable of catalysing its effects to help the insurrection win the day.

The Afghan model under the microscope – strengths and weaknesses

The Afghan, Iraqi and Libyan examples allow us to define the chief characteristics of the model, and to explore the advantages and the limitations. It can be summed up simply in the form of the following triptych: airpower, and special forces in partnership with local forces, for the conduct of air-ground operations. Special forces operate primarily as a catalyst for airpower, allowing local forces to carry the day in spite of numerical and materiel inferiority. As happened in the battle for Mazar-i-Sharif, the Northern Alliance with 2,000 men was able to win against 5,000 well-entrenched and well-equipped Taliban fighters. Special Forces can also assume roles beyond airstrike guidance: training, supervision, technical advice and intelligence support to the local command. In targeting terms, the concept of full spectrum targeting is best adapted to seizing the totality of the effects that the model makes possible: lethal airpower guided by special forces strike the enemy forces, non-lethal resources provide intelligence and resupply of men, equipment and rations. Morale, military capabilities, and the population supporting the local allies are the targets for preservation, just as the morale, command and control and military capabilities of the enemy are the targets for destruction. The psychological impact of the air arm on the adversary is that much stronger in that he is incapable of countering its effects, as testified by Taliban prisoners captured during Enduring Freedom. ⁽⁶⁾

A number of conditions are needed for the Afghan model to function correctly. They affect the three components, and determine the limitations of the model.

In airpower terms, success in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya should not make us forget that the prerequisites indispensable to any attempt to apply the model are the acquisition and maintenance of air superiority. This prerequisite may impose a long, costly and crippling campaign against an enemy with robust air defence. The discussions in the media of a possible military intervention in Syria are a good example. ⁽⁷⁾ Without air superiority, the model is quite simply inapplicable. Even once acquired, all is not yet won. Local allies and Special Forces are still particularly vulnerable when faced with enemy troops with superior numbers and equipment, as shown by the battle of Debecka. Such inferiority must be compensated by unfailing air support. High endurance ISR capabilities are vital to avoiding nasty surprises, hence a campaign whose ultra-sophisticated air component is often in contrast with the rusticity of troops on the ground. According to a RAND study, the first months of Operation Enduring Freedom were far more demanding of data links than the more conventional Iraqi campaign of 2003. ⁽⁸⁾

Support for friendly forces equally requires great air support know-how, in both its lethal and non-lethal aspects. The accuracy of a guided weapon must go hand-in-hand with adjustable lethality according to the enemy’s ability to adapt. Having experienced the devastating effects of allied airpower on its very exposed motorised columns, as at Tarin Kowt on 18 November 2001, the Taliban retreated to well-prepared and camouflaged defensive positions that even the 2,000lb JDAM could not totally destroy. During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, the American heli-borne forces on objective Ginger had a very hard time with Al-Qaeda militants well dug in to positions that resisted a number of consecutive strikes. ⁽⁹⁾ Unified Protector also confirmed the need for a wide range of armament covering the full spectrum of destructive effect. In the Libyan case, limited-effect munitions were in short supply, shown by the recourse to using laser-guided inert bombs, to strike the enemy scattered in a densely populated urban environment without collateral damage. The Royal Air Force likewise made intensive use of its well-adapted Brimstone munitions, to the point of virtually exhausting its stocks. ⁽¹⁰⁾

In the non-lethal category, there is a vital need for solid and reliable tactical transport aircraft support, to be able to infiltrate special forces, to resupply them and to supply equipment to local forces, as at the Jebel Nefoussa in Libya. Precision airdropping capabilities can offset the lack of secured landing sites and the isolation of friendly forces. ⁽¹¹⁾ To that must of course be added the inherent resources of any air campaign: C2, in-flight refuelling, combat search and rescue, and more still. Clearly, a whole range of air operational capabilities has to be mastered, which de facto puts a limit on the number of air forces capable of applying the Afghan model independently, or at least of making a decisive contribution within a coalition. This necessary major air effort can quickly reduce the attraction of a model, whose ground component might seem less demanding in human and materiel resources. Operating in a coalition will clearly compensate for certain shortcomings.

As to the ground sector, special forces must obviously be able to master all the techniques and procedures of air support. Their role however goes way beyond simple air strike guidance. Operation Anaconda illustrated the limits of air-portable ISR capabilities: in spite of a month of intensive observation of an operational zone covering no more than 100 square kilometres, half the enemy positions had escaped detection before the start of the operation. When the geography is unfavourable, the forces in contact have to make up for these limitations. This is the case in the mountainous terrain of a great part of Afghanistan, but also in urban environments, which are increasingly the theatres of modern conflict. The role of special forces is therefore to compensate as far as possible for the limits of sensors, by sending information obtained at first hand or gathered by local allies. That works in both directions, allowing the allies to benefit from information gathered by airborne sensors. The employment of Western special forces in this role during the rebel advance on Tripoli emerges clearly from the initial studies of Operation Unified Protector. ⁽¹²⁾

Interaction with local allies also needs the maintenance of a pool of linguists and regional experts within the special forces, capable of interacting quickly and effectively with the local partners. Although in Afghanistan the American teams were able to draw on the CIA’s contacts with the Northern Alliance, it took several weeks for the Western and Arab special forces to build an effective partnership with the geographically scattered Libyan allies, who lacked a unified command.

The existence of these local allies is the third component of the Afghan model, whose chief quality lies in their availability as allies of circumstance. The presence of forces that have a degree of political and military credibility is of course crucial to the success of the model. The choice of local partner cannot be a neutral one, for in an insurrection gathering together different movements against a common enemy, the support given to some rather than others gives rise to political consideration of the organisation of force relationships which will dictate the future government of the country.

Amongst the criteria which determine the choice of this ally, the level of military credibility is not necessarily determining if it is compensated by the ability to rally sufficient numbers of potential combatants. Experience shows that it is possible to adapt to a wide range of situations. The future combatant does not have to be particularly well trained if it is possible to instruct him in the necessary rudiments of combat in areas out of hostile range. Equipment can be supplied by air if needed, as at Jebel Nefoussa. Once the combatant is on a war footing, the special forces can give advice to the leaders, ensure the coordination of airstrikes and contribute to the synchronisation of ground force action with the air campaign plan. Against all expectations, the result is the victory of the armed greengrocer over the professional soldier. ⁽¹³⁾

It is nonetheless essential to be well aware of the tactical limitations of the local partner, not necessarily able to understand or execute complex manoeuvres against an experienced enemy. Special forces in their limited numbers are always vulnerable to a sudden collapse of their allies. A capital point for the model’s success is that the protagonists must share essentially the same strategic objectives. The fall of the Taliban regime in the first weeks of Enduring Freedom or of the Gaddafi regime gave the common interest needed for common success. On the other hand, the examples of Tora Bora or of Operation Anaconda reveal the danger of not having enough ground troops to offset the shortcomings of the Afghan ally, poorly motivated for the pursuit of foreign Al-Qaeda fighters, especially in the depths of winter, in particularly mountainous terrain. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The Afghan model and Operation Serval

On 12 January 2013, France set in motion Operation Serval in Mali, to stop the terrorist offensive south of the river Niger and to hinder these movements from threatening the State of Mali. After an initial phase of reaction and stabilisation, the offensive was launched to retake the Niger loop and then to restore the integrity of Mali’s northern territory. Do the first lessons learned from Operation Serval indicate recourse to the Afghan model? It has to be admitted that the first few weeks did not really lend themselves to its application, because of the extreme weakness of the Mali armed forces, incapable of playing the role of a sufficiently militarily credible local ally. The French intervention was shaped as a response to this weakness. French soldiers were on the front line, alongside those Malian units which had retained a degree of cohesion, and whose morale and military effectiveness were boosted by strong air support and the presence on the ground of an impressive number of French combat elements. This strong French presence up front, notably during the recapture of the Niger loop, ruled out the application of the Afghan model.

Nonetheless, the model evidently played a more important role at the start of the offensive into the Adrar Mountains, in its application to an African ally of considerable military credibility in desert warfare: the Chadian armed forces. The intervention of General Mahamet Idriss Deby Itmo’s troops, especially during the Ametettai valley battle, included French combat aircraft and helicopters, which imply the presence of forward air controllers attached to the Chadian units to coordinate and guide them. ⁽¹⁵⁾

The Afghan model retains all its relevance, therefore, in the Mali conflict, having finally found an African ally sufficiently militarily capable for its application, which alone confirms the crucial importance of this condition for its effective application. The Afghan model could not have worked in the first days of Operation Serval, but with militarily capable African units it became viable.

Implications for the Air force

The Afghan model is far from being a panacea in modern warfare. To succeed it must meet precise criteria. It is not risk-free for the indigenous allies, is dependent on foreign air support or special forces commandos, and is vulnerable in the event of the defection of its local partner. It needs a dose of strategic patience before its effects can be seen, even if, by comparison with a more conventional campaign it offers the possibility of swift execution, which fits well with the intrinsic qualities of air power: rapid power projection, long reach, agility, ubiquity, firepower and flexibility. It cannot guarantee to win the peace once the campaign is over: the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the deterioration of the situation in northern Iraq in the months following the fall of Saddam Hussein, ⁽¹⁶⁾ and the uncertainties still prevailing over Libya’s future are all reasons for prudence.

Nonetheless, ten years after its appearance, the Afghan model reaffirmed its relevance in Libya. Its intrinsic qualities of catalyst for the air arm serve to increase its strategic utility. Its political and financial cost is lower than for a conventional campaign. It may not resolve conflicts on its own, but that is so for all military interventions, conventional or not. It opens possibilities for its application in the crisis arc where there is a number of hostile regimes, totalitarian but vulnerable to a determined insurrection. That, at any rate is the opinion of American strategists: the withdrawal from Iraq, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the need to reduce the budget deficit have led President Obama to announce new strategic directions that break with the previous decades’. More demanding in the type and place of their commitments, the United States is seeking to make use of credible partners, with whom tasks can be shared—particularly those whose vital interests are not at stake. The Afghan model allows the United States to commit minimally, making best use of their superiority in the air.

For France, at a time of decisions regarding capabilities, it has to be said that the model arouses suspicion, even outright rejection. Calling it delegated interventionism is proof of an under-estimation of the political and military commitment it involves. Its limitations are regularly highlighted, to the detriment of its coercive value, when in fact it reinforces the effectiveness of military interventions whenever the situation imposes the support of a local partner without large-scale deployment of ground troops. Its potentially damaging effects on the evolution of the size and shape of the armed forces also comes under fire, as seen in a recent article: ‘this model….could be used to justify reductions in ground forces. ⁽¹⁷⁾ This criticism tends to forget too quickly the necessary conditions for the model’s use, which are special enough to prevent it from being regarded routinely as the most desirable method of operation.

It would therefore be detrimental to our armed forces if they were deprived of this tool of demonstrated coercive value, not least because they already have all the elements needed for its implementation. We must preserve the air support expertise forged in Afghanistan and demonstrated in Libya, a solid component of special forces airmen trained in those techniques, as part of a larger grouping of all-arms special forces capable of training and advising foreign partners. It naturally goes hand-in-hand with an air force capable of supplying the framework for application of the model, its C2, its ISR capabilities and its lethal and non-lethal resources. All these elements exist and have proved their worth. We must now acknowledge their symbiotic character within the framework of the Afghan model, and incorporate it fully in the range of strategic options for our armed forces. As one of its best advocates sums it up, ‘planners in the future should consider the model as an operational method of primary importance rather than as an emergency procedure’. ⁽¹⁸⁾♦

(1) Robert Kagan, Finding the Target: the transformation of American military policy, New York, Encounter Books, 2006, p. 293.
(2) Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving rapid dominance, Washington, National Defense University Institute of National Security Strategy, 1996, pp. xxiv-xxvi.
(3) Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye, Paris, Fayard, 2012, p. 471.
(4) Philippe Gros, De Odyssey Dawn à Unified Protector : bilan transitoire, perspectives et premiers enseignements de l’engagement en Libye, FRS, note N° 04/11, April 2011, p. 18.
(5) RUSI, Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya operation, Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September 2011, pp. 11-12.
(6) Charles J. Dunlap, Short changing the Joint Fight? An airman’s assessment of FM 3-24 and the case for developing truly joint COIN doctrine, Maxwell AFB, Air University Monograph, 2007, p. 41.
(7) See the reaction following the loss of a Turkish fighter in Syria’s downing of Turkish jet demonstrates sophisticated air defence, Seattle Times, 27 June 2012.
(8) Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower against Terror: America’s conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Santa Monica, Rand, 2005, p. 352.
(9) Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the future of warfare: implications for army and defence policy, Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, p. 37.
(10) Royal United Services Institute, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 6
(11) RUSI, op. cit. foot note 5, p. 11, Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. foot note 3, pp. 391-392, and Jean-Marc Tanguy, Harmattan : Récits et révélations, Paris, Nimrod, 2012, p. 51.
(12) RUSI, op. cit. footnote 5, p. 12, and Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, pp. 470-471.
(13) Jean-Christophe Notin, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 526.
(14) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, Winning with Allies: the strategic value of the Afghan model, International Security, vol 30, n° 3, Winter 2005/2006, p. 34.
(15) See particularly L’armée tchadienne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali, Le Monde, 4 March 2013; and L’appui crucial des Tchadiens au nord du Mali, Le Figaro.fr, 17 March 2013.
(16) Largely due to the clumsiness of the 101st Airborne Division deployed after the battles were over, according to Richard Andre in The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq, The Journal of Strategic studies, vol.29, n° 3, June 2006, pp. 414-417.
(17) Défense et Sécurité International, Les limites de l’interventionnisme par délégation, DSI No. 87, December 2012, pp. 10-11.
(18) Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, op. cit. footnote 14, p. 47.