With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, crisis returned to Europe. NATO’s posture for ensuring the collective defence of Europe has been considerably strengthened as a consequence. It is unfortunate that it is often necessary to be confronted by realities on the ground in order to move the lines of battle, and this conflict is allowing us to validate a number of concepts and arguments long upheld by many national and NATO military authorities. Among them, the characteristics particular to the air environment are showing their relevance and are now more appropriate than ever.

Calling on my experience as second in command of the NATO Air Component over the past three years, I want to show how NATO, and in particular its air element, had initiated the strategic and operational moves well before the fateful date of 24 February. This major development will serve to explain how the air component responded to political expectations and was capable of ensuring the protection of the Eastern European population from the very first hours of the conflict. This crisis nevertheless demonstrates clearly the need to develop our capabilities for facing a high-intensity conflict and for ensuring our resilience.

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The American General Tod D. Wolters, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) from 2019 to 2022, and previously COMAIRCOM (Commander Allied Air Command), was the driving power behind the dynamic development of a new NATO military strategy and a new set of domain and region-related strategic plans. This development meant that high-intensity, hybrid and multi-domain issues could be properly taken into account, as could the permanent state of competition that exists even in peacetime.

NATO had not revised or updated its strategic plans for nearly 60 years. The framework documents of the military alliance proved largely unsuited to the current international context and the resurgence of potential crisis in Europe. Overall, the plans allowed no flexibility and could not be applied to the hybrid and high-intensity situations found today. The Military Committee’s development in 2019 of a new NATO Military Strategy led to the drafting of two reference documents which took into account the now hybrid nature of crises and conflicts, together with the need to adopt a multi-domain approach:

– first, the concept for deterrence⁽¹⁾ and defence in SACEUR’s area of responsibility, the Deter and Defend Concept,⁽²⁾ which outlines the need to conduct military activity in time of peace to make an all-round show of our presence, and to operate simultaneously in multiple theatres, and

– second, the concept for development of NATO’s military organisation, the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept,⁽³⁾ which identifies the need for adapting the organisation for the next twenty years in order to keep it aligned with the threats.

This major revolution in Alliance strategy brought with it a general revision in the operational command of the set of plans which now offer SACEUR the flexibility he needs to ensure overall deterrence and prevent our competitors and enemies as early as possible from imposing their will on us.

SACEUR’s aim was to make the command and control (C2) structures more agile and more flexible. It introduced the Supported/Supporting Interrelationship between the different commands as a function of the effects desired, and is defined in the Joint C2 CONOPS⁽⁴⁾ issued in the summer of 2019. The command in the best position to synchronise and coordinate effects in time and space is the supported command, with all others supporting it. This notion allows us to break away from the rationale regarding ownership of assets, which creates much frustration and misunderstanding: it means we can focus on the expertise of each domain in the knowledge that the integration of effects is being handled by the command having best visibility. At the AIRCOM level this meant a complete overhaul of the Air C2 CONOPS. The principal aspects to be considered were agility and flexibility, reactivity and permanence, and resilience.

General Jeffrey L. Harrigian (COMAIRCOM from 2019 to 2022) wished to build a C2 structure, adaptable from time of peace through crisis and conflict situations. The principle of centralised command but decentralised execution remained the keystone of the new concept. Centralisation of decision-making at his level allows him, as commander of the air forces component, to optimise the use of critical assets by distancing himself from the areas of responsibility and allowing the transfer of certain assets from one area to another, subject to SACEUR’s agreement. Delegation of responsibility and authority to lower levels is provided for in order to strengthen the reactivity and resilience of the structure. Since coordination and synchronisation with the JFC and JTF⁽⁵⁾ will always be crucial, a Deputy Commander Air, and a team appropriate to the situation in hand, is appointed to each Joint Commander’s staff.

Work also had to be done on reactivity, the main failing identified during the build-up during 2019. The NATO Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) command structure required several days to achieve operational capacity following a decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to activate it, a delay incompatible with the objectives of the NATO Response Force (NRF), the tempo of contemporary action and, above all, with the new set of strategic plans. AIRCOM therefore created a Core Air C2 capability, manned solely by personnel at Ramstein, in Germany,⁽⁶⁾ whose principal function is to initiate the cycle of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements and setting up the JFAC.

Regarding structure, the latest joint exercises conducted in 2019 and 2021 showed that to face up to an adversary who possesses robust air defence and who is conducting hybrid action, there is a need to synchronise the effects produced by the different domains (air, land, sea, cyber, space and information), in particular by integrating non-kinetic effects into kinetic operations. With this objective, AIRCOM has developed an effects synchronisation team, and a division for non-kinetic operations whose representatives are integrated within each division of the JFAC command structure (strategy, combat plans and combat ops). This cross-domain way of operation leads to better integration of effects throughout the ATO cycle, hence optimal effectiveness of the various actions. Though still at the development stage, these structures have been activated in order to face the potential consequences of the war in Ukraine.

Extensive work on the Handover-Takeover process has been done with AIRCOM and the US Air Forces in Europe, especially to facilitate the transition between a national or coalition structure to the NATO structure or vice-versa. The concept had its first test during Exercise Ramstein Ambition 2020. Work continues to finalise the standardisation of operational processes and documents.

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The gradual adaptation of plans and associated command structures since 2019 allowed the NATO air component to be in a position on 24 February 2022 to defend the airspace for which it was responsible. Before that date, the build-up was aided by a number of exercises and events:

– The Core Air C2 was activated on two occasions: the first, to manage the rotations of transport aircraft during the evacuation of Afghan nationals, and the second, after November 2021 to enable the prudent planning of the NATO posture in case of a Russian attack on Ukraine. These two operations highlighted the value of this organisation, through its permanence, expertise and reactivity.

– The Deputy Commander Air model was tested during several exercises and proved very effective during the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, when AIRCOM general officers were deployed to the JFCs in Naples, in Italy, and Brunssum, in the Netherlands. Their presence aided the complex understanding of operations, drafting of orders and planning of defence phases.

Several months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in close collaboration with NATO air forces and in addition to the air assets then available, AIRCOM had prepared an alerting system for air assets to protect NATO’s Eastern front. In accordance with political expectations, this step was purely defensive and non-escalatory but demonstrated our determination to protect the territory of NATO’s Member Countries. In just a few hours following the Russian attack on Ukraine the entire Eastern front, from the Baltic Countries to Bulgaria, was protected by combat air patrols supported by intelligence-gathering and in-flight refuelling tanker aircraft, as well as others on ground alert.

Several key factors explain this result:

– The very close relationship between the Chiefs of air staff of the NATO countries and COMAIRCOM. It stemmed from the high level of confidence reigning over the regular meetings in Ramstein.

– Sharing of essential intelligence in order to adapt the organisation to the real situation.

– Highly detailed planning for use of airspace, which always comes under national control. In peace time it is vital to coordinate military and civil activity. Action by Eastern countries was remarkable in the search for the best compromise.

– Proven principles of air action, which include reactivity (the ability to respond to a political decision in just a few hours), reach (some patrols took off from national soil to conduct the mission), concentration of effort (NATO’s entire Eastern front was covered), reversibility in order to adapt the arrangements to the situation (amend patrols as a function of the actual threat), and immediate interoperability between allies (the result of frequent common training).

The air action also showed very strong cohesion within the Alliance through the participation of the majority of Member Countries in a position to react at very short notice.

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Whilst the air component was able to react speedily, and be the first to respond to the political objectives, there is still some way to go before achieving sustainability, ensuring satisfactory resilience and protecting Europe effectively. Effort still needs to be expended, particularly in the following areas:

• Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD): The aim is to have visibility across the entire range of missions for protecting Europe and to be capable of handling all types of threat, from ballistic missiles to cruise missiles to combat aircraft and drones. Nevertheless, the evolution of the IAMD chain of command and the recent adaptation of posture to the security situation will not overcome the desperate shortage of assets (sensors and effectors) among NATO nations, the fewer opportunities for combined training or the lack of prioritisation of points to defend. Recognition of this situation needs to be made at the political level if there is to be any hope that IAMD becomes a priority in armament programmes. The major points that need to be taken into account:

– capability, with priority given to improving sensors.
– an adapted C2 structure.
– architecture which allows connection between all actors.
– a posture that ensures reactivity.

• Space: Technological advances and the militarisation of space by some countries have compelled NATO to reconsider space as a new field of battle on the same level as the cyber domain. In December 2019 the Alliance declared space the 5^th operational domain. A road map for 2020-2025 has been drawn up which specifies both the missions and the resources (such as HR, infrastructure and budget) necessary to implement the initial space plan. NATO’s space structure will be based on a Theatre Space Component and a NATO Space Centre commanded by COMAIRCOM. The NATO Space Centre is currently sited within AIRCOM and manned by personnel from the Command and other experts specifically put in place by Member Countries. The build-up of the Centre of Excellence in Toulouse should also contribute significantly to developing the space dimension within NATO.

Even though the NATO Space Centre has yet to declare its operational capability, it is already permanently committed to exercises and real action. It is called upon by all military components and by Member Countries as an organisation unequalled with regard to the collection and sharing of space information. Even though the Alliance has no plan to acquire its own space assets, the NATO Space Centre will be a wonderful hub for information on our competitors’ knowledge and understanding via its many links with national space centres.

• Synchronisation of fires and targeting: The complexity of theatres of operations, together with the capabilities of our competitors now requires a combination of multi-domain action if we are to avoid being driven by adversaries’ intentions. AIRCOM has established within the JFAC command structure an effects synchronisation cell and a division for non-kinetic operations, intended to provide overall coordination of action in order to achieve the sought-after effects. These structures were set in place during recent exercises and fully demonstrated their value throughout different phases of the campaign.

Whether in a peacetime environment, or when conducting military operations becomes a challenge (airspace management), or in a situation when a crisis has been declared, non-kinetic operations play a crucial role: in particular in the information war which, despite considerable progress, continues to demand greater effort to reach the level of our competitors.

Right from the deterrent phase, the joint effects synchronisation team enables planning of desired effects as early as possible in the C2 Air process. It integrates both kinetic and non-kinetic effects and ensures close, interlinked coordination with the various components. In view of the rapidity of operations today, these two divisions have proven beneficial during the latest exercises. Now, with the war in Ukraine, they are fully committed on a daily basis within the NATO JFAC command structure.

Regarding synchronisation of fires, there has been much discussion on targeting procedures, which are far from perfect in the Alliance as a result of the number of actors in the decisional process, along with often unclear roles and responsibilities of the different HQ staffs involved. The aim is to define the process of prioritisation of targets, on one hand using the principles of the new C2 concept, and on the other optimising the decisional cycle.

The air component advocates a theatre-level approach to arrive at a matrix and authority for synchronisation of individual effects which is coherent with the flexibility sought by SACEUR as a function of the phases of the operation. The phase of dealing with the adversary’s Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities is an excellent example of where the air component can be better placed to achieve synchronisation of effects.

• Capability development: The complex and changing character of the contemporary security situation has compelled the Alliance to speed up its decision-making processes and acquire better knowledge and understanding of its potential adversaries to determine the best-adapted posture. The new strategic plans and the new C2 concepts clearly help the acceleration of decision cycles and reactivity of the posture. Despite all of this, the fact remains that the available assets are not all compatible with the modern world. In both European and NATO contexts, several sectors merit considerable further effort:

– We need to develop our capability for managing and exploiting data and sharing it more easily. Data management is one of the key points clearly identified by the current Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT, in Norfolk, Va). It will define our ability to keep the advantage in future conflicts.

– Connectivity is determinant in synchronising effects in an ever-shorter timescale. It would seem that the most appropriate solution is to try to develop equipment and arrangements that are designed from the outset to be interoperable, at the same time ensuring the interoperability of existing assets, particularly between 4^th and 5^th generation aircraft (among which, Rafale and F-35). The networks that link the headquarters with each other and with the units on the ground need particular attention.

– Innovation must be the inspiration that feeds our adaptation, and focus on a DevSecOps (development, security, and operations) approach. The development and adaptation of systems must be done in an agile manner; software coders should discuss directly with operators. The approach of the US Air Force, and the creation of its Kessel Run laboratory is an example to follow.

– Quantity: as the French Chief of the Air and Space Staff’s strategic vision⁽⁷⁾ clearly states, sustainability is a key capability, in particular in the fields of war economy and Maintenance in operational condition (Maintien en condition opérationnelle—MCO). In the Western world, for the moment only the United States is able to ensure continuity in high-intensity effort. In the current climate, we cannot make any assumption about the capabilities that the United States might bring to Europe, especially if operations are underway in several theatres. It is therefore vital that Europe make a major effort to overcome this shortfall in areas such as the number of aircraft and the ability to arm and equip them (with weapons and self-protection systems, for example), ground-to-air systems and means for intelligence gathering in contested environments, to name but a few.

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The conflict in Ukraine has made us conscious that Europe is no longer sheltered from a major crisis or war on its soil. Even though NATO, and in particular its air component, has begun to put itself in battle order to face a high-intensity conflict, it is essential that Alliance Member Countries, and in particular the European ones, grasp the measure of the organisational and capability developments that are necessary to provide effective protection for their populations. ♦