In recent decades, the nature of warfare has undergone a dramatic change. From conventional (symmetric) war, between states possessing traditional armed forces we have moved on to ‘asymmetric’ warfare, pitting armed groups against nation-states, in a ‘weak against the strong’ relationship. Terrorism is one of the best illustrations of this asymmetry in conflicts. The fight between Israel and Hezbollah on Lebanese soil is typical of the development of these ‘asymmetric wars’ into ‘unlimited wars’. By ‘limits’ we must understand and include every type of limitation that might exist in a conflict–geographic, spiritual, technical, moral or economic. The theatre of operations is not limited to the ‘battlefield’, it is polymorphous and omnidirectional. It combines military operations with action in the economic, juridical, political and diplomatic spheres, in areas out of the battle. It reaches out, according to the potential for success, within its own lines, the lines of its allies, or into the enemy rear, to the heart of the population. The only really important element is ‘the end’, in other words the victory, whatever the means necessary to achieve it. The tactic of unlimited war strikes at the heart of society’s fundamental values (humanity, society, culture, hate, love, conscience), whilst stripping them of their meaning, retaining only the strategic potential and its capacity to influence events. The ‘choice’ of Lebanon as a battlefield lies in the proxy war strategy, which allows third-party states to settle their differences whilst avoiding direct confrontation, with the consequent human and economic losses. One of the aims of unlimited warfare is also to weaken the offensive and defensive capabilities of a country by obliging it to operate on several fronts simultaneously, thereby splitting its forces.

Unconventional Warfare

Hezbollah strategy is a prime example of this ‘unlimited warfare’ (of which the original concept was developed by Chinese strategists during the 1990s to confront the increase in American military might). If you want to draw a comparison between the respective aims of the belligerents, you could say that the Israelis are fighting, essentially, to obtain military success on the battlefield, to secure their borders, and that civilian casualties are the immediate consequences, without in any way being an aim in itself. Hezbollah is fighting primarily to win victories far from the military battlefield, but making use of events occurring there to gain access to Western and Arab media, and to the Internet, where civilian losses are a useful tool for bending public opinion. With this aim in mind the Shia faction has developed a strategy whereby its forces are camouflaged within civilian buildings and populations. Thereafter it can launch attacks from these sites against Tsahal (the Israel Defence Forces-IDF), and fire rockets against civilian targets on Israeli soil, knowing full well that the IDF will locate the source of the attacks and respond by bombarding the sites–from which Hezbollah has already withdrawn to open a new front elsewhere. In this way, Hezbollah makes use of its opponent’s power to its own advantage, at the cost of the many civilian victims sacrificed on the battlefield of the public opinion war. It looks as if Israel has already lost that war, thanks to its own military, financial and technological superiority. The strength that guarantees its survival is the basis of its defeat in the media. The mounting numbers of civilian victims, the images of the endless suffering of Lebanese women and children have overcome logic. Of course it is hard to believe that anyone can find legitimacy in the suffering of innocents, whether or not they end up as martyrs. None the less, it is important to realise that the swing of public opinion against Israel, which has developed as the days have gone by, is the result of a cunningly orchestrated strategy, to which Western public opinion has indirectly contributed. It is not because opinions and perceptions change that the doctrines, ideologies and values of the belligerents are also going to change.

Cyber-Citizen or Cyber-Soldier?

We have, without realising it, become the new soldiers of this ‘unlimited warfare’ that the belligerents have launched on the field of our perceptions. The Lebanese drama has pricked our consciences, and the information flow from the various media sources has forged our convictions. Most people construct their system of beliefs (in the sociological sense) in accordance with the way in which they perceive reality, but you don’t have to go back to the ancient philosophers to understand that this reality, when all is said and done, is somewhat subjective; and this subjectivity is food and drink for the belligerents. Manipulated in this information war, we collaborate unwittingly in the dynamics of the conflict whose battlefields invade our screens, just by signing an on-line petition, or by passing on an e-mail or a PowerPoint presentation expressing support. Sometimes you might even find your name on a distribution list, leading the recipients to believe that you have ‘chosen’ your camp. It is interesting to note that, to communicate, Hezbollah and its sympathisers use cultural methods and symbols to which they are totally opposed, culturally and ideologically.