The United States is currently attempting (both bilaterally and through NATO) to promote a European anti-missile defence system which will be fully integrated with that which they are developing to protect their own territory. The result is that both the future of nuclear forces and a possible anti-missile defence are becoming critical issues in terms of sovereignty for France, and for Europe as a whole.

Current major geostrategic trends demonstrate the prime importance of preventive actions combining diplomacy (treaties, aid and pressure) and low-level expeditionary operations involving intelligence and Special Forces. They also suggest that the most likely threat in the short and medium term (apart from terrorism) is that of blackmail by a regional power equipped with weapons of mass destruction capable of damaging our vital interests.

To be in a position to use counter-blackmail or, better, to use counter-deterrence, implies the possession of a credible nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, if we are to impose a pause for reflection on a power which is prepared deliberately to sacrifice part of its population and infrastructure, and to reinforce deterrence, then this ‘mass’ nuclear deterrence must be complemented by the knowledge that his control centres can be precisely targeted.

In this way the old adage that ‘nuclear deterrence both works and encourages wisdom’ becomes quite relevant, depending on the situation. When this is combined with an understandable tendency to wish to replace the virtual sword of nuclear deterrence with a real shield, it is easy to understand the growing interest in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence.

This has two variants: theatre defence, which is to do with military operations, and strategic defence. It is the latter which concerns us here.

For countries outside the group of proliferating states, the reality today is that the strategic ballistic missile threat is zero, and is very low in the medium term. It would be a colossal expense to counter this threat by an anti-missile defence which would only intercept relatively unsophisticated missiles of proliferating countries, and would be totally ineffective in practice. The possibility would always remain that even a relatively primitive missile could penetrate an anti-missile shield; if this missile is a potential nuclear weapon vector, then the defender could not take the risk, and a complex, costly defence limited to one sole threat would be defeated.

It follows that just as the strategic anti-missile defence of the United States is only credible due to the strategic nuclear force of which it is the complement, a European ABM defence without any deterrence capability would remain a fig-leaf, making Europe permanently dependent on the United States for its defence.

Forecasting is always difficult, and surprises are the rule. So it is important (even if it does not at the moment seem urgent) to establish a European ABM strategic technology monitoring process, in parallel with the key development of a theatre defence capability. Moreover, long-range surveillance assets would allow us to monitor nuclear tests worldwide and localise launch sites. This would also be useful in the context of a European nuclear deterrence; a study of the tools that will be necessary and preparation for debates and consultations should be done rapidly.

France must take its full part in this work and widen its air defence capability, if possible as part of a European cooperative project, to include anti-missile protection for force projection (theatre defence). In order to counter the new sub-strategic threats, France must also look to develop the quality of its means of deterrence (gesticulation capabilities, flexibility of employment and defence avoidance) and to complement these with powerful, accurate, long-range conventional weapons (cruise missiles).♦