In an article in last month’s issue of Défense nationale et sécurité collective entitled ‘The Afghan nightmare: an update’, the author showed how NATO action in Afghanistan is missing the point: the drugs war. He highlighted the way in which the Americans and their allies have taken the wrong track to the point of alienating a population initially well disposed towards them. The Atlantic Alliance is caught up in an interventionist spiral, and we have to ask ourselves what we are fighting for in Afghanistan. The answer to that question will tell us whether the operation should be maintained, with the sacrifices that that will entail, or whether NATO should withdraw to allow other forces to take over.
The Afghan Nightmare: What is To Be Done?
A number of harsh realities have to be borne in mind when analysing the Afghan question. First, in spite of five years of ‘pacification’, and $100 billion poured into the country–often in the shape of bombs–Afghanistan is still number five on the list of the world’s poorest countries. Next, whereas in 2001, and thanks to the Taliban’s anti-drug policy, opium cultivation had been reduced to 8,000 hectares of Afghan territory, today it covers 165,000!(1) There is no more glaring proof of the West’s failure in this land. Last, the appalling fact should not be forgotten that 70 per cent of Afghans suffer from psychiatric problems,(2) after so many years of war. The heroin and opium available everywhere provide some form of relief for this mental distress: as a result, of a population of 28 million, at least one million are drug addicts.
The state of physical and mental wretchedness of the Afghan people and the West’s failure to provide a solution have to be borne constantly in mind when attempting to make a sound analysis of the future of the world’s most disinherited country.
Why Intervene in Afghanistan?
Since 2001 we have had the ‘war against terrorism’ drummed into us. We have been deluged with images of swashbuckling troops, well-fed and equipped with priceless materiel, conducting skilful operations against a nebulous thing called ‘terrorism’. However, this amorphous entity takes on more definite shape when, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, nationalist sentiment joins hands with inspired religious fanaticism to create a war of liberation against the interventionists who have become invaders. An absurd duel has transpired, that of the sledgehammer against a fly whose constant movement allows it to avoid being crushed.
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