The history of the international nuclear scene is one of rivalry between nations for the development of nuclear technology and the desire of some to maintain their positions of advantage. That is why, according to General Pierre Gallois, ‘the Iranian affair is more than just the nuclear question, and manifests the socio-economic fault lines that divide–and contrast–the old industrialised nations from the new, West from East’.⁽¹⁾ While, regardless of the regime in power, the United States has always refused to grant Iran the right to a complete nuclear fuel cycle, geostrategic circumstances and economic rivalries are what structure transatlantic relationships; thus Europe has adopted ‘made in America’ concepts and doctrines. As far as Russia is concerned, it is both part of the problem and part of the solution. In contrast, Iran, seeking to become a free agent, has desperately been knocking on all available doors to help it complete its nuclear programme. The adventure began with the Shah and it has been long and hard, plagued with indecision, sudden reversals, secrets, tensions and, at the end of the day, a diplomatic crisis whose outcome is still impossible to foresee.

The Political Dimension of Nuclear Capability

Although not easy, one has to try to understand the rationale that drives nations to seek to acquire nuclear weapons. ‘It is always difficult to envisage the reasons behind a need for weapons. It is much more difficult to know what one does with them once one has them’, as an American historian has observed.⁽²⁾ The Middle East is thus without doubt the region with the greatest concentration of military resources within a limited area. As for the nuclear threat presented by the Middle East, it is difficult to measure in the light of the traditional secrecy that surrounds everything related to nuclear matters where lack of information is the norm, in both the civilian and military sectors. There is also the willingness of the United States and Israel to use this threat to their own ends.

While, according to Benjamin Goldsmith, in answer to General de Gaulle, ‘nuclear technology is like sex amongst the young: one can delay it [proliferation] but you can’t stop it’,⁽³⁾ the ability of a country to pursue a military nuclear programme, apart from the problem of access to fissile material, depends also on mastery of the technology and skills. The Iranians possess all this today. However, resolve is the origin of proliferation, its catalyst. The level of enrichment is what distinguishes the civil from the military but the boundary remains a political one. This is why one should treat with caution US analyses based on a simple technical risk assessment along the lines: ‘I can do it therefore I will’.⁽⁴⁾