The redeployment of Russian arms sales since 2000 illustrates Russia’s renewed presence on every continent, combined with real political voluntarism. But Moscow is faced with structural blockages in its arms industry and the consequent dissatisfaction of its customers. The financial crisis could call a halt to Russian ambitions in the international arms market. If its two privileged levers—arms and energy—disappear, what will remain in Moscow’s diplomatic arsenal to maintain its influence on the international scene?
Russian International Influence Through Arms Export
Russian arms exports have been continuously increasing: from less than $2 billion in 1998, they reached between $5 and $6 billion in 2004, and were headed for $8 billion in 2008. While these figures need to be treated with caution,(1) they nonetheless represent a profound change compared with the 1990s: the fratricidal competition that existed between state agencies and businesses to seize export contracts prejudiced the success of Russian exports because of the lack of visibility and credibility that it engendered. The Russian state now regards arms exports as an essential tool of its foreign policy, to affirm the return of a powerful Russia on the international scene, in regions where it had been absent since the collapse of the USSR: South-East Asia, South America, the Middle East and so on.
Since 2000, Russian arms exports have become the privileged vector of its foreign policy, in combination with debt rescheduling with client states and agreements in the oil, gas and nuclear sectors. Recent examples of agreements signed with Algeria, Venezuela and Indonesia show the effectiveness of this combination of complex financial operations and ‘overall security proposals’.
Implementation of this policy was preceded by a rationalisation of the administrative organisations responsible for ‘military-technical cooperation policy’, essentially of the three principal bodies:
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