Be it a widespread loss of electricity, a prolonged shortage of fuel in service stations or the unavailability of banks, a major event of this kind is likely to affect the life and security of the population and will eventually compromise the economic stability of the nation. Each such event is presumed to be the result of a defect in infrastructure classified as critical. The concept of critical infrastructure looks at these complex systems whose continuity must be assured, in so far as even a minor interruption in activity, or degradation of the service, would have a negative impact on the system and those who depend on it.

Because they were obliged to give a response to large-scale events such as the ‘flu pandemic and extreme terrorism, public authorities could not ignore this vulnerability. They therefore drew up ambitious arrangements based on established doctrine. The arrangements for the security of activities of vital importance, developed by the SGDN (National Defence Secretariat-General), and for the protection of critical infrastructure, set up by the European Commission, both have much the same aims, even if they have slightly different approaches to the problems.⁽¹⁾

Whilst public authorities initiate such projects, it is the operators in both public and private sectors who put them into operation on the ground. The majority of companies who manage infrastructure today are the descendants of a public service, and they include the big financial institutions, water companies and oil refining and transportation companies. Their antecedence does not preserve them from new business strategies and logic peculiar to each sector. This look at critical infrastructure questions the very reality of public-private partnerships by putting them at the centre of the security issue.