Pakistan’s missile arsenal comprises short range and medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads. These missiles form components of Pakistan’s “full-spectrum deterrence”.

Pakistan’s rocket technology development program commenced in the 1960s and the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was set up and Pakistan was able to receive US rocket technology know-how through its scientists visiting the United States for such training ⁽¹⁾. Assistance was also sought from North Korea and from China. 

Missile capabilities

The Hatf-1 is a road-mobile solid propelled ballistic missile and this Hatf-1 also has an improved version with an enhanced range of 100kms, Hatf-1A and Hatf-1B ⁽²⁾. These improved versions have guidance systems, but despite their ability of carry warheads of weight 500kgs, they are typically suitable as artillery systems ⁽³⁾. The Hatf-2 is also road mobile missile is called Abdali and has a range of 180-200kms. The missile has accuracy to target both counter-force assets and counter-vailing assets ⁽⁴⁾.

In 2021, Pakistan also tested the Guided Multi Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Fatah-1 with a range of 140kms ⁽⁵⁾. The longer-range Fatah-2 can hit targets at 400kms range and are fitted with cutting edge avionics, sophisticated navigation system and unique flight trajectory and can engage targets with high precision ⁽⁶⁾.

The Hatf-3 or the Ghaznavi is a derivation of Chinese M-11 ballistic missile with a range of 290kms capable of delivering nuclear warheads ⁽⁷⁾. The missile has undergone both day and night testing, ensuring operational readiness ⁽⁸⁾. Pakistan also possesses liquid fuelled Ghauri missiles that are nuclear capable and despite its liquid fuelled propulsion, the missile is still existing in Pakistan’s arsenal and as latest as in 2023, the missile underwent successful testing ⁽⁹⁾. The missile is also called Hatf-5 and has a range of 1.500kms.

One of the reasons why Pakistan has focused on retaining this missile in its arsenal despite the Shaheen missile systems is because liquid fuelled ballistic missiles have high throw-weight ration. Also, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine does not reject a “first-use” scenario. A humble number of liquid fuelled missiles help them to create the ambience of dilemma in the minds of adversaries regarding their doctrine.

Pakistan has also conducted flight tests of Ababeel missile which can carry multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It is a medium range ballistic missile with a range of 2.200kms. The missile is a three-staged solid propelled missile system. Three stages help to increase the range of the missiles and hence, with MIRVs that are believed to have a negative impact on range of missile systems, three staging would negate that negative impact. Pakistan has also developed a 60kms range Hatf-9 tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) that could be launched from MLRS ⁽¹⁰⁾ to close the conventional superiority gap with India.

Cruise missile capability

Pakistan focused on developing cruise missile capability in the 1990s following India’s venture into cruise missile development program ⁽¹¹⁾. Pakistan’s cruise missile arsenals comprising Babur and Ra’ad cruise missiles are also nuclear capable. Known as the Hatf-8, the Ra’ad I and II versions have ranges of 350kms and 550kms respectively. The missile can engage with targets with high-precision. They are air-launched versions and hence, provide stand-off nuclear capability to Pakistan’s air power. The Babur missile, also known as the Hatf-7, is land-based cruise missile and has a range of 700kms while the Babur-1B incorporates advance aerodynamics and avionics that can strike targets both at land and at sea ⁽¹²⁾. Pakistan has also developed sea-launched version of Babur missile with a range of 450kms ⁽¹³⁾. The missile is capable of being vertically launched and hence, can be launched from Vertical Launch System (VLS). This means many missiles can be fired rapidly at a given time without the complexity of reloading them.

Given the increased range of such missiles and ability to provide stand-off capability to the, these cruise missiles are strategic weapons rather than tactical ones though they could be used to achieve tactical objectives. The technologically advanced Babur missiles are equipped with Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) and Digital Scene-Mapping Area Correlation (DSMAC) ⁽¹⁴⁾ for being able to deliver conventional and non-conventional warheads at varied targets with accuracy and also improve terminal accuracy respectively by matching the real time imagery with stored imagery information. 

Shaheen

Despite the development of nuclear capable cruise missiles and tactical nuclear capable ballistic missile in Pakistan, Pakistan’s Shaheen category ballistic missiles form the backbone of its nuclear deterrence. Pakistan’s Shaheen missiles range from short range category to longer range ones that can reach targets up to Israel and ideal weapon system to strengthen its “full spectrum deterrence” in a manner that is not strategically destabilizing. Shaheen category ballistic missiles are deterrent against India’s Agni category nuclear deterrence capability. 

Though analysts claim that Pakistan’s nuclear threat perceptions are confined to India also, its Shaheen-3 missile with a range of 2750kms are capable of targeting Israel. Pakistan also faces threat from a possible nuclear Iran while developments in the Indo-Pacific region affect China’s nuclear modernization process leading to a domino effect in India which Pakistan has to follow suit. 

Pakistan’s Shaheen category missiles range from short to intermediate range. Pakistan’s Shaheen 1A is an improved version of nuclear capable Shaheen-1 missiles with a range of 900kms. The single-stage Shaheen-1 missile has a range of 750kms while range of Shaheen-2 missile is increased by staging- two stage missile system with a range of 1500-2000kms. Though unconfirmed, it is believed that the Shaheen-2 is derived from the Chinese M-18 missile. The Shaheen-3, is a two-staged solid propelled missile with a range of 2.750kms and reportedly could reach targets in Israel also, namely the Dimona facility. 

A post separation attitude correction (PCAS) system in Shaheen improves its accuracy and provides greater scope to the missile to remain un-intercepted. This PCAS feature also exists in Shaheen-3 missiles. Accuracy in Shaheen-2 missile is increased with the help of separating warheads fitted with four small motors ⁽¹⁵⁾. Equipping the missiles with PCAS restrict the need for other forms of technology that could enhance accuracy of the missile system. It also helps the missile to modify the trajectory and hence, evade enemy defense capabilities. Also, Shaheen-3 is reportedly eighteen times faster than sound and hence, such high-speed weapon systems could render air and missile defence capabilities null and void.

These surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have solid propulsion systems reducing preparation time to launch them and hence, negating the scope of a “use them or lose them” dilemma.

Unlike the Shaheen-1 missile that uses an eight wheeled Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) as launcher, the Shaheen-2 will use a bigger TEL: twelve wheeled. It can also be mounted upon Missile Transporter. This indicates that the missile can be launched from non-challenging terrains as well as rugged and challenging terrains. Missile Transporters can be non-integrated also and hence, perfect when Pakistan follows nuclear deterrence by keeping its arsenal in semi or completely knocked down state. Non-integrated launch platforms could provide Pakistan to keep its missile in assembled form but still maintain a posture of recessed deterrence.

Continuous flight testing of these missile capabilities takes place to revalidate various design and technical parameters of the weapon system ⁽¹⁶⁾. Such validations confirm the operational readiness of the missile system. Operational readiness determines deterrent capability of the missile system. The higher the success rate of the technical and design parameters of the missile, the greater the role in combat operations, and thus, strengthened deterrence. 

Merely possessing of missile capabilities do not strengthen deterrence: whether conventional or nuclear. Missiles must be protected in a way that they cannot be accidentally launched. In 2023, there were reports that the Shaheen-3 accidentally targeted a nuclear facility in Dera Ghazi Khan city ⁽¹⁷⁾.

The dilemma over miniaturization

While reports suggest that Pakistan has developed TNW and MIRV capabilities, there are dilemmas regarding its technological know-how to miniaturize nuclear weapons. MIRVs and TNWs would require miniaturized nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan’s nuclear program focuses on plutonium nuclear weapons which are easier to miniaturise than uranium enriched nuclear weapons. Moreover, the caliber for Nasr missile is small for fitting of nuclear warhead and there are no reports to support an argument that Pakistan has technological sophistication to miniaturize such small caliber artillery systems. However, state systems are working on ways to develop advanced weapon systems to strengthen their deterrence. In future, Pakistan could be in possession of advanced capabilities that could be launched from low caliber artillery systems.

Doctrinal Shifts and Role of Missiles

Pakistan initially followed a doctrine a “Minimum Credible Deterrence” that focused on minimum deterrent capabilities that would be credible. Minimum deterrent capabilities with little credibility negate deterrence. Credibility is enhanced by strengthening survivability of nuclear assets. Road mobile missiles with solid propulsion improve survivability of the missile systems. 

However, Pakistan has shifted from this doctrine to a more inclusive (for Pakistan) doctrine of ‘full spectrum deterrence’ (FSD) in which nuclear capabilities of long range to short ranges of battlefield levels would comprise deterrent composition. Such capabilities are assumed to strengthen Rawalpindi’s nuclear deterrence especially to counter India’s “Cold Start” doctrine by providing nuclear deterrence capabilities as well as nuclear war-fighting capabilities. Liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles like Ghauri create a scenario of “use them or lose them” and hence, apt for “first-use”. Thus, missiles along with Pakistan’s TNWs and air-launched cruise missiles, provide a base for skeptics to believe that Pakistan could have a “first-use” nuclear doctrine.

However, TNWs launched from MLRS require greater “defense by denial” to protect such capabilities against enemy attacks. An attack on these MLRS carrying TNWs would mean a nuclear catastrophe for Pakistan’s own forces and in its own territories. This means greater role of air-defense would need to be taken into account. That would require increased air-power strength as more the number of MLRS on border, the more the number of aircraft required to defend them. This means greater role of strategic asset like air-power to protect tactical assets like TNWs which may not be cost-effective.

Also, westerly winds could have impact on such capabilities resulting in cataclysm to its own assets. In addition, maneuver warfare demands swift and safe maneuver of combat assets, even if it is nuclear war-fighting assets. In battlefield level, such weapons add pressure on the safety and security of maneuver warfare. Thus, while TNWs form integral component of Pakistan’s FSD, their susceptibility to cause damage and destruction to their own forces bind them into limitations making them strategically destabilizing.

Conclusion

Pakistan has focused on missiles that are capable of providing nuclear deterrence at battlefield level as well as at strategic level. The threat perceptions are not confined to only India, but states like Iran and Israel are also of concern for Rawalpindi. The focus would be on enhancing survivability of these missile systems, whether tactical or strategic so as to strengthen the FSD. ♦

(1) “Pakistan Missile”, NTI (https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-missile/).
(2) “Hatf-1”, Federation of American Scientists (https://nuke.fas.org/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-1.htm).
(3) “Hatf1”, Missile Threat, August 5, 2021 (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-1/).
(4) “Abdali (Hatf2)”, Missile Threat, August 2, 2021 (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-2/).
(5) “Pakistan successfully conducts flight test of Ababeel Weapon System: Army”, The Indian Express, October 18, 2023 (https://indianexpress.com/).
(6) Islamuddin Sajid, “Pakistan successfully tests indigenously developed Fatah-II guided multi-launch rocket system”, Anadolu Ajensi, December 27, 2023 (www.aa.com.tr/).
(7) “Pakistan tests nuclear-capable Hatf-III ballistic missile”, NDTV, May 10, 2012 (www.ndtv.com/).
(8) Masao Dahlgren, “Pakistan fires Hatf 3 Ballistic Missile”, Missile Threat, January 23, 2020 (https://missilethreat.csis.org/pakistan-fires-hatf-3-ballistic-missile/).
(9) “Pakistan successfully conducts training launch of Ghauri Weapon System”, The Economic Times, October 24, 2023 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/).
(10) “Hatf-9 ‘Nasr’”, Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-9/).
(11) “Babur (Hatf-7)”, Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-7/).
(12) “Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Enhanced Version of Babur Cruise Missile”, The Economic Times, April 14, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/).
(13) Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Tests Sub-launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile”, Voice of America, March 29, 2018 (www.voanews.com/).
(14) “Pakistan Successfully Tests ‘Babur Version-2’ Cruise Missile”, Quwa, December 14, 2016.
(15) “Shaheen 2 (Hatf-6)”, Missile Threat, August 9, 2021 (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-6/).
(16) “Pakistan conducts flight test of Shaheen-III ballistic missile”, Khaleej Times, April 9, 2022 (https://indianexpress.com/).
(17) Pawan Atri, “Pakistan’s Shaheen-3 Missile Strikes Nuclear Facility After Failed Test: Media”, Sputnik News, October 6, 2023 (https://sputniknews.in/).