One of the most striking aspects of the London bombings of July 2005 was the response they triggered from all the different people and organisations involved in dealing with them. Commentators throughout the world praised the phlegmatic, ‘typically British’ reaction of the people of London as well as the emergency and other services; the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, summed it up as ‘business as usual’. Many in the emergency services, including soldiers, put it another way: ‘it felt just like an exercise’. As the General Officer Commanding London District (my French opposite number is the Gouverneur Militaire de Paris), I certainly share that view. Let me stress at once that this does not denigrate the suffering of those who were killed and injured, and their families: like all soldiers, I take responsibility for those I serve and have a duty to protect. My point is that when faced by the bombs on 7 July 2005, not only did our training kick in, but also the experience of particular, well-focused exercises. In that respect, we were well prepared.

Resilience

Let me dwell further on the subject of how those of us with roles in what the Americans call ‘homeland defence’ can prepare to deal with terrorism on the scale practised by al-Qaeda and their imitators. In the United Kingdom generally, and in London in particular, we refer not to ‘homeland defence’, but to ‘resilience’. I see this as more than a matter of semantics. For a start, it embraces other challenges to our people and their livelihoods (and of course our very many guests, workers and visitors from every country on earth). It includes natural as well as man-made threats, ranging from floods through ’flu to terrorism. ‘Resilience’ also implies the enormously important business of dealing with the aftermath of such events–the ‘consequence management’. This, then, is my first observation: the fundamental importance of focusing not just on how we try to prevent and protect against disasters, but also how we bounce back from them.

The Public

Focusing on recovery relates intimately to my second observation: the crucial business of engaging the public, before as well as after any events. This is a very complex area which requires judgements at the highest level about the balance between informing the public and maintaining normality and morale. This is difficult enough even in a small and homogenous society; it is far more complicated in a society as heterogeneous as London’s. Whatever messages are desired, the process demands the engagement of the media, and therefore excellent media relations. From the purely military perspective, the most important aspect of informing the public is managing their expectations. There is a widespread assumption that the Armed Forces will always ride to the rescue, whatever the situation. Even among politicians, let alone the media and the public, there is such an expectation, based on historic events and successes such as our role in firefighting during national fire service strikes, or in dealing with the aftermath of the national foot-and-mouth epidemic. We have to work constantly to remind people of the reality, that our Armed Forces are structured, resourced and equipped for war and other operations overseas; and our small numbers and high operational tempo mean that we must be regarded as the last resort when it comes to aid to the civil authorities. In this we have the advantage over many of our allies, that we have never had a tradition of massive, conscript armed forces. We have always been relatively small in numbers, and generally employed overseas, so it is very unusual to see soldiers on the streets of Britain. It is more difficult to make people realise that we are simply not equipped to conduct most of the increasingly technical jobs of the civilian emergency services.