The nuclear experimentation indulged in by North Korea and the tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme show that the nuclear question, far from having disappeared from the field of international relations with the end of the Cold War, is more than ever in the news. Are the tools for the control of nuclear dissemination still appropriate, or do they merely reflect a vanished world, totally out of kilter with a new strategic situation with which we have not yet come fully to terms? The aim of this article is to show that the NPT, despite its dated aspects, should be retained because it represents the ultimate barrier against uncontrolled proliferation, which would be dangerous for the world. It must, however, be renewed and complemented, in particular by regional agreements and international measures governing fuel supplies.
Successes and Failures of the NPT: How Can Nuclear Proliferation be Curbed?
Let us first of all recall some fundamental points. TheNuclear proliferation poses a lethal threat to the future of the human race. It is therefore necessary to pay particular attention to developments in the information available on this subject, in order to forestall a chain of events which could plunge humanity into a deadly nuclear conflict. Today, everything tends to indicate that nuclear proliferation is at a crossroads. first is that the more holders of nuclear weapons exist, the greater the probability that they will be used.
Secondly, we can state that nuclear proliferation is a quasi-irreversible process. In practice, only South Africa has renounced atomic weapons, and that in the very particular context of the situation in South African in 1990: an internal crisis, the death throes of a moribund regime, accompanied by a disastrous external situation.(1) One must therefore bear in mind that nuclear proliferation, and thus the probability which arises of effective use of this weapon can only increase.
A third point is that the stability of the nuclear order has, up to now, been guaranteed by the quasi-universal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whose extension for an indefinite period was agreed in 1995. The last conference to examine the treaty, in May 2005, was not a success, in particular because the principal nuclear powers refused to tie their hands with over-restrictive constraints. It is also worth noting that three non-signatory states of the NPT have acquired nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan having carried out tests on their territory, in contrast to Israel, which has never publicly admitted having the bomb. On the other hand–and this is important to understand the Iranian situation–the treaty does not forbid the development of a civil nuclear programme, no matter what technology it is based on, but on the contrary affirms the right of non-nuclear countries to have access to civil atomic energy and even makes it a duty of nuclear weapon states (NWS) to help them.
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