The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was set up in Darfur just two years after the creation of the African Union (AU). Initially intended as a 100-strong observation mission, it increased progressively to 3,000 and now numbers over 7,000 yet has been unable to prevent the degradation in the security situation seen in recent months. The operation has been less than a complete success but the failure stems largely from the inability of political negotiations to arrive at an inclusive agreement. Relations between the EU and the AU are not what they might be but there are possibilities for improvement.
A first assessment of AMIS and AU-EU cooperation in Darfur
Despite the Darfur Peace Agreement reached in Abuja on 5 May last, and signed up to by Minni Minawi (SLM), (1) one of the component forces of the rebellion, fighting has increased around Darfur between government troops and non-signatories, and the humanitarian situation is again deteriorating. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the observer force put in place by the African Union (AU) in 2004, has been accused of ineffectiveness and its replacement has been decided by the UN under Security Council Resolution 1706. The mandate of AMIS expires at the end of December 2006 and it seems opportune to make an initial, if partial, assessment of the mission.(2)
AMIS is the AU’s first major operation and is moreover the first instance of a new system of crisis management, using the principle of subsidiarity where operations and mediation are conducted by the AU, logistic support comes from the EU and NATO and political support from the UN. This structure, already made fragile by the differing agendas of the players involved, has been severely tested by a hardening of attitudes of the parties in the conflict.
The Long-term Difficulties of AMIS
An Ever-larger Force
AMIS is the fruit of the conversion of the former OAU (Organisation of African Unity) into the AU, and is the first tangible evidence of Africa’s commitment to managing its crises itself, following the creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Conscious of being involved in settling a crisis which the US Congress had described as genocide, from the end of 2003 the AU took part in negotiations conducted without lasting success by Chad. On 8 April 2004, a humanitarian ceasefire was signed, which provided for the establishment of observers to verify its application. The 138 observers agreed to (including 18 from Western countries) were in place from May that year. The EU decided to finance this force from the newly established African Peace Facility (APF), a fund drawn from European development funds.(3)
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