During the past 30 years Shi’ism has undergone a political and identity renaissance without precedent, as demonstrated by the communities of Central Asia and the Middle East. The growth of Iranian influence and the reaffirmation of their identity by the Shia of Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan have fed the fear in several Sunni and Western capitals of seeing the emergence of a pan-Shia sphere of solidarity under Iranian influence, stretching from the Great Wall of China to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem.

From this apprehension over the past few years has developed the thesis of a ‘Shia Crescent’, a new geopolitical grouping occupying a key position on the Eurasian chessboard, and a potential source of regional and international instability. Even if it is obviously too early to think about the eventual appearance of a pro-Iranian ‘Grand Shi’istan’, on the other hand it is pertinent to ask questions about the position that the ‘Shia Crescent’ occupies in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Is it an important constituent of this policy, or is it merely a map designed to serve Iranian regional and international ambitions?

This article has two objectives: firstly, to address an issue of current interest which is little discussed, and secondly to update studies of Iranian foreign policy which up to the present have concentrated essentially on the nuclear question. Putting the pan-Shia question into perspective also enables us to understand better the underlying logic of an Iranian foreign policy which frequently gives the impression of being both improvised and incoherent.