France today has air and space capabilities that correspond to the needs of its political leaders. Their use helps fulfil the ‘knowledge and anticipation’ function listed in the White Paper and gives them a central role in operations. And in conjunction with command and control (C2) systems that promise much greater military effectiveness it gives the Air Force the ability to carry out the full range of aerospace operations, in particular guaranteeing national sovereignty, something that very few air forces can do.
The Operational Use of Aerospace Power—the Shape of Things to Come
Since the end of the Cold War, the major Western nations have had to adapt their defence arrangements to a continually changing geostrategic context. This undertaking has been all the more challenging for an ambitious country like France. Our armed forces, the Air Force in particular, have not been spared the difficult task of reconciling demanding objectives with tight budgets. Nevertheless, France today has credible air and space capabilities, both on national territory and in external theatres of operation, which are interoperable and which correspond to the needs of our political leaders.
The current tasks facing French aerospace power include: coping surgically with violence, as proved daily in Afghanistan; being the framework nation in a rapid reaction air force, as demonstrated with the certification of the JFACC(1) for NATO Response Force (NRF) 12; the daily protection of our fellow citizens from threats coming from the air as well as on the occasion of high-visibility events; beginning to ‘domesticate’ space by surveillance; and taking into account continual technological and doctrinal changes.
From the first Gulf War to the Afghan crisis, including former Yugoslavia and the tragic events of 11 September, the Air Force has changed considerably, to reach a level of performance which today puts it among the first-ranking air powers of the world. This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s and 1980s, air power had already undergone major upheavals, but the main driver then was the increased performance of aircraft. Today, it is the whole range of parameters, contexts and environments of crises which is changing, while simultaneously the digital revolution enables a mass of information to be distributed to the lowest tactical echelons.
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