It is hard to miss the signs: the French and the Americans have been quietly getting closer together. Primarily, this involves collaboration in the area of general foreign policy. As recently as 2003 Dominique de Villepin, Foreign Minister at the time, delivered a hard-hitting speech on 14 February of that year before the Assembly General of the United Nations, opposing armed intervention alongside the Americans in Iraq. This diatribe contributed to tension in Franco-American diplomatic relations. To make matters worse, it was based on France’s possession of an independent decision-making capability, thanks to the optical sensors of its Hélios satellites, whose images did not support the American claim that weapons of mass destruction were present on Iraqi soil. But time passed and the diplomats did their work. The election of a new French President in 2007 ushered in a new era in Franco-American relations. The two states worked together on many issues brought to the United Nations and, in some cases, to the Security Council. In time, the rift of 2003 was forgotten and confidence was gradually restored. The apt expression used by Hubert Védrine sums up the relations between the two states: ‘friends and allies but non-aligned’.

Although the space dimension can be the source of profound diplomatic disagreement (for example, involvement in a theatre of operations with the aim of conducting a war), it can also prove to be a fruitful area of cooperation between states. France and the United States are both space powers and share a certain mutual confidence. These two elements constitute a fundamental base for cooperation.

Long-standing and fruitful inter-agency cooperation

Franco-American cooperation between their respective space agencies is a long-standing reality: NASA and the French centre for space studies (Centre national des études spatiales—Cnes) have established solid partnerships in the various domains. Two important examples are the Jason programme and cooperation on orbiting space debris. Although this inter-agency cooperation may be seen as exclusively civilian, the military applications are apparent in both cases. The success of the Topex-Poseidon experimental programme in 1992 opened the way to long-term cooperation in the field of radar altimetry. The aim is to capture precision data on ocean currents and their variations as well as measuring sea levels. This Cnes–NASA cooperation continues today, especially in connection with the planned launch in 2014 of a third satellite (Jason 3).

A second area of cooperation symptomatic of good inter-agency relations is that concerning space debris. Although this is a long-standing problem, it is taking on a more strategic dimension thanks to the growing interest which the problem is creating within multilateral groupings. Initially, NASA scientists grew concerned about the creation of debris resulting from anti-satellite trials by the American Defense Department, in particular one in September 1985. The NASA experts at the time tried to alert the international scientific community to this question of debris via the national space agencies. The explosion of an Ariane stage on 26 November 1986 also motivated NASA to make contact with the European Space Agency and to set up working groups on space debris. The problem also struck a chord with Cnes. Informal contacts were later institutionalized in 1993 with the creation of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), a technical organisation which brings together analyses on the topic.

A recent example of this fertile collaboration was the construction and dispatch to Mars of the Curiosity rover, whose mission was to analyse the soil of the planet. The fact that it was the fruit of collaboration between France and the United States, and in particular between Cnes and NASA, is however relatively little-known.

From these examples it is clear that cooperation was made possible by the pursuit of common scientific interests and the fact that scientists on either side of the Atlantic were able to establish durable and mutually confident relationships by virtue of their many exchanges.

Military cooperation through exchange of information and practices

This type of relationship is more difficult to establish on a military level because the areas of cooperation tend to affect national sovereignty and are therefore generally the province of political decision-makers. France made the choice, more than half a century ago, to become a space power. Owing to its connection with the nuclear deterrent, space has since acquired a strategic dimension. Around this original ambition France has gradually developed the full spectrum of space capabilities (telecommunications, observation, navigation, monitoring and early warning). The use of space has therefore become a key component of military activities and a force multiplier, especially in external operations. In July 2010 France created a unified command centre, the joint space command (Commandement interarmées de l’Espace – CIE), which constitutes the point of contact for any militarily-relevant space matter.

To be considered as a complete space power, France must fulfil four indispensable criteria: have independent access to space, have an industry capable of designing and building launchers and satellites, be capable of operating a ground control system and, finally, be able to monitor space. The first three exist and the ability to monitor space is in full development. The Defence Code includes the latter capability in ‘wider air defence’ coming under the air defence and operations command (Commandement de la défense aérienne et des opérations aériennes – CDAOA) and in particular its space surveillance division. The Air Force, under the direction of the CIE, is responsible for the surveillance of extra-atmospheric space. The responsibility attributed to the Air Force is expressly military and touches on the intelligence area. The sensitivity of this sector makes the establishment of cooperation more difficult but not impossible.

Intelligence is by far the most sensitive area. The Americans are France’s allies in space matters and we are often dependent on American data. Although a channel exists it is nonetheless very restricted. France does not belong to the intelligence-sharing community known as ‘five eyes’. This community consists of a remarkable forum for information sharing headed by the United States and including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These states are clearly not renowned for their space capabilities, but the existence of the community is based primarily on the historical links which they share, and the alliance benefits from total confidence between the members. The United States have thus recently (in 2010) signed a cooperation agreement with Australia concerning space surveillance. This agreement is all the more useful for the United States because it gives it coverage of the southern hemisphere, a region which is otherwise out of their reach.

Although France does not belong to this intelligence community, which nevertheless allows it to preserve a certain independence of view of a situation, one development has promoted Franco-American relations in intelligence matters. This is the acquisition by France of the space surveillance radar network (Grand réseau adapté à la veille spatiale – Graves). It was delivered to the Air Force in December 2005 and is capable of detecting any object larger than one square metre overflying French territory at between 400 and 1000 km altitude. The acquisition of this capability, originally conceived as a demonstrator, has given France eyes in space. The radar has performed beyond expectations. According to American and European estimates dating from 2012, more than 23,000 objects larger than 10 cm are currently circling the Earth at an average speed of 25,000 kph. In watching low-earth orbit, which is the most crowded orbit for satellites and debris, the Graves system can catalogue some 3,000 objects.

An operational tool has therefore been transformed into a diplomatic one, able to detect hitherto unknown satellites. With the acquisition of this technical capability, French credibility as a space power was reaffirmed. From the moment that France possessed something with a trading value, it became a credible partner with which it was worth cooperating, if only to find out what it was able to see. This event sparked off Franco-American cooperation and, after two years of informal existence, the Franco-American space cooperation forum was formalized on 14 May 2009. Later, on 8 February 2011, a declaration of principles was signed by Alain Juppé, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Robert Gates, the United States Secretary for Defense, in order to improve Franco-American cooperation in space surveillance.

Another sign of openness was the historic participation of France in the Schriever Wargame in 2012. The 2012 version of this simulation, organised by the US Air Force Space Command, was the first open to NATO member countries. The object of this exercise is to plan and coordinate the space and cyber capabilities of the member states in a specific scenario. Although NATO is only in the early stages of its involvement in space matters, the development possibilities are important. Participation in this simulation should not be considered mere window dressing. It is an opportunity to rub shoulders with allies, to compare points of view and procedures, and thus to enhance the coordination of space capabilities between states. In addition, it is likely that the reintegration of France into the NATO Integrated Military Command in 2009 will allow these developments to be optimized. Finally, it is possible that the Franco-American space relationship could use the privileged NATO structure to reach its full potential.

Changing American spatial diplomacy

This recent rapprochement also owes much to Barack Obama’s arrival in power in January 2009. Even though a turning point in the space dimension occurred at the end of George W. Bush’s term of office, it did not lead to a real renewal of cooperation. On the other hand, the 2010 publication of the US National Space Policy (NSP), marked a change, at least in tone. The previous NSP (2006) had raised concerns as to the possible design and use of anti-satellite weapons, and its tone reflected the unilateralist, if not militarist approach of the Bush administration. The 2010 NSP contrasted sharply in its tone with the 2006 version, particularly in that it emphasized that the space systems of all nations should be able to develop without interference from other states. In addition, it clearly emphasized cooperation, including in the military sphere. The goal was to avoid misunderstandings or miscalculations in space, which had become an increasingly sought after, congested and contested domain. The calls for cooperation were of course not directed solely at France, but the fact remains that they constituted a window of opportunity to achieve closer collaboration. This opportunity was seized by France and Europe, which decided to promote a Code of Conduct in space. This project, aimed at avoiding any conflict in space by sponsoring contact between the increasingly numerous space countries, is an initiative promoted under the French presidency of the European Union during the second half of 2008. While the United States habitually opposes on principle any text capable of limiting their freedom of action in space, this project was not rejected out of hand. It was, of course, the subject of lively internal debate. Nonetheless, the American presidential will inclined more towards declared support for the development of the Code, and the status of the text of a ‘code of conduct’ allows the American President to adopt it without having to have it ratified by the Senate, which is much more cautious on these questions. In the case of a treaty, the Senate would have had to ratify it with a two thirds majority. The ‘code of conduct for space’ approach was therefore supported in the main by the American administration, subject to a few modifications.

This diplomatic and political approach incorporated an inter-agency rapprochement and military collaboration. International consultations on the Code were initiated, which also aimed at promoting the Code internationally. Although the project was supported by various United Nations agencies, it was discussed outside all the multinational fora, especially UN ones, in order to avoid any of the usual stumbling blocks such as those which routinely occur in disarmament negotiations. A Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) has recently been set up: representing a dozen countries, it is charged with discussing the possibilities of regulating inter-state relations in space. This group is quite active and can advance the cause of the Code. Within the GGE, France, the United States and Great Britain consult prior to the meetings in order to adopt a common position with the other partners. Although this approach culminates at the level of foreign ministers and departments of state, it is symptomatic of a certain renewal of transatlantic relations. It is also interesting to note that the air forces of these three states have created a privileged partnership in the trilateral strategic studies group, whose objective is to strengthen mutual comprehension and understanding to ensure greater interoperability. Space is naturally involved because of its operational applications, which directly involve the aerospace resources of these three forces.

The French and the Americans thus have more opportunities to meet and exchange ideas. This has the effect of homogenizing ideas, preferences and beliefs before the development and dissemination of rules and multilateral policies. But the existence of a common objective (principally, not to turn space into a battlefield) must not hide the fact that the two space powers have a different strategy for the occupation of space. The United States has developed the doctrine of space dominance which still guides their actions today. Nevertheless, there exists between the two states great potential for future cooperation, especially in space surveillance, a domain in which the French Air Force has sole responsibility for these questions. It therefore plays a pre-eminent role, since beyond these exchanges of data it also enables France to keep a sufficient degree of sovereignty to ensure autonomy in situational appreciation and decision-making. ♦