For over fifteen years Western air forces have enjoyed total freedom of action in operations conducted in the main against irregular adversaries in unstable areas. They have been able to put permanent pressure on those adversaries everywhere in a theatre and to give effective support to forces on the ground. Resurgence of threats to that power could yet alter the physiognomy of future conflicts.

Russia and, in lesser measure, China have developed effective ground-air systems of significantly increased range compared with those used at the beginning of the century. In modernising their organisation these countries have pushed ahead with integration of these weapons into robust, coherent and resilient defence systems that have considerably improved their capabilities for defence. These assets, when associated with broadly modernised combat air fleets, are contributing to the establishment of A2/AD (Anti Access/Area Denial) strategies aimed at depriving Western air forces of their freedom of action, which it would now be rash to take for granted. These two countries are progressively exporting this equipment to a growing number of regional powers, or are supporting them directly through deployments, as in Syria.

As a result, the liberty to conduct operations can henceforth be challenged, whether in military confrontations, even limited ones, against these powers or in regional conflicts where these systems are present. In this context, military effectiveness will depend on optimum coordination of effects in order to recover, then retain sufficient freedom of action to achieve the objectives set at the political level. Collaborative combat, which enhances the intrinsic capabilities of each system taken individually, will then be essential if we are to win the day. The connectivity underlying this is a fundamental pillar for future capabilities, which absolutely must be considered, developed incrementally then tested over the next decade in order to maintain superiority in the years 2030-2040.

Combat zones ever more contested

To ensure freedom of action in the air, on the ground or at sea, it is essential to have air superiority: it is a prerequisite to any sizeable military operation from the gathering of intelligence, to deployment, during the engagement with the adversary and through to stabilisation. Air forces therefore play a key role in the conduct of joint operations in contested environments.

Performance of defences will generally improve well before 2030 through a combination of materiel with complementary performance in multi-layer architectures, those with short or very short-range systems of low lethality but high resilience because of their mobility, protecting highly effective though more static, and therefore more easily detectable, strategic launchers. This generation of defences is already allowing these major powers to protect their centres of gravity and also to extend their intercept capability beyond their borders by virtue of their very long range, which leads to aggressive creation of sanctuaries of bordering territories in a strategy of ambiguity, as in Ukraine in 2014.

In the case of future crisis, even in a limited regional conflict, an adversary possessing such systems would potentially be in apposition to protect both his rear and his front lines and to project a highly-contested volume of airspace ahead of his positions. Allied air defence would have to operate without any depth of field, therefore conceding, even if temporarily, some freedom to the adverse air assets to limit our own air and ground forces. In such a case the adversary would degrade our ability to gather intelligence and limit our capability for action against his rear bases, supply lines and front line formations. Air and ground combat would only be made harder.

Despite this reinforcement of defences, combat aircraft supported by the other components will continue to occupy a central position in the battle for freedom of manoeuvre because of their reach and capacity to concentrate effects rapidly, and their survivability. It is precisely because of this that one of the principal missions of the Future combat air system (FCAS, Système de combat aérien du futur—SCAF), which should enter service around 2040, will be to ensure air superiority.

The challenge of collaborative combat

Given these developments, modes of combat action developed up to now are no longer sufficient to gain the advantage in a hotly contested environment. It needs permanent adaptation of both force and mission, of ability to penetrate and operate inside the threat envelope, to be in a position to constrain the adversary, to regain then retain local air superiority to reverse the balance of forces, then once again be able to act on his rear and his centres of gravity. Against this background the logic of a simple duel between platforms is no longer valid: henceforth collaborative combat is the order of the day with platforms cooperating with each other using enhanced connectivity that allows them together to be part of an overall system whose combined performance is greater than the sum of its parts.

This new approach means considerable investment in development of connectivity between airborne platforms and also with systems operating on the ground and at sea. Central to future collaborative air combat in the near future is the F4 standard Rafale, and in the longer term, around 2040, the FCAS. But what advances are needed to achieve this objective? What capabilities have to be developed?

Enhanced connectivity at the centre of these developments

To be able to operate in contested environments and to reverse the balance of force we have to ensure the survivability of the assets committed and to outdo the adversary by more agile manoeuvres. To do this, linking all players together is primordial if their joint performance is to be markedly increased. The development of enhanced connectivity within the overall air combat system (Système global de combat aérien—SGCA) clearly involves improvement in the means of communication and also in handling of an increasing volume of data to speed up decision-making, in turn necessitating development of dedicated tools based upon artificial intelligence.

In the past the SGCA was connected to other forces’ systems and to those of allies by slow and limited methods which left much to human intervention. Although successive developments have led to improvement in radio communication and tactical data links that allow greater exchange of formatted data without the use of voice, the air combat system still relies on a disparate collection of weapon and communication systems, each designed independently then put together by piecemeal adaptations. With that goes major limitation in its capacity for development, which considerably inhibits integration of new digital devices. Current exchange of data remains limited in volume, between a limited number of players and often at very limited data rates. In short, the capability for coordination, sharing of information and adaptation remain limited and far short of what is needed if we are to benefit fully from the massive data flows that are part of the rapid developments afforded by the digital world.

Current connectivity therefore inhibits development of closer collaboration between weapon systems, between sensors,and communication and with munitions to improve agility and overall performance of SGCA, and prevents us from having informational superiority over the adversary. It requires a step change in dimension if we are to fight more effectively in these contested areas where the threat is permanent.

The ability to detect and engage air threats or targets before being detected and engaged oneself relies in particular on a capacity for rapid handling and correlation of information of varied quality and quantity. New information technologies being developed in the civilian world afford solutions to the growing challenge of short-cycle handling of vast quantities of data dispersed across numerous systems. Four digital technologies lie at the heart of future connected collaborative combat: networked assets for medium and long range digital transmission, cyber security, analysis of masses of data (Big Data Analytics) and artificial intelligence (AI). As long as it is adapted to the specific requirements of air warfare, exploitation of big data offers sight of opportunities for major developments in the balance of forces in favour of he who first uses it to his advantage.

The advent of an air combat system designed as a network will be a fundamental factor of superiority in the conception of air missions, since it will increase the collaborative combat capacity of the various components’ contributions by merging the capability of each sensor or weapon independently of the platform carrying them. Such is objective of the Air Force’s Connect@Aéro initiative, which aims at ensuring coherence in capability to the benefit of connectivity across the entire system in order to enhance the effectiveness of the air forces.

Rafale F4: a first step towards connected collaborative combat

The ambitious aims of the future F4 standard of the Rafale are coherent with the anticipated development of threats for around 2025. The Minister for the armed forces, Florence Parly, declared this new standard “a technological leap, an industrial leap and a strategic leap”.⁽¹⁾ It is the first move towards the FCAS, which is planned to enter service around 2040, and lays the technological foundation stones of the connectivity essential to support collaborative combat at that time.

The F4 standard will introduce genuine collaborative combat capability by sharing information obtained from active and passive sensors. Radars working in collaboration will have increased detection capability against stealthy targets and those operating at very low altitude and masked by topography. The standard is also intended to permit sharing of effectors in order to achieve better survivability of assets. Hence an air-to-air missile could be launched from one Rafale and guided to its target by another. Other, passive, captors will also be able to share their data within a patrol to enhance a tactical picture shared instantaneously among all the aircrews. These transmissions will be made by radio software.

One of the peculiarities of the air arm is the great distance between the various assets participating in a given mission. Rafale will therefore be able to exchange information permanently via SATCOM with MRTT replenishment aircraft flying in safe zones, with the CUGE⁽²⁾ system for updates on the situation, with a drone or a command centre to receive target designation. Today a not insignificant number of missions is conducted without contact foe lack of appropriate means of exchanging information at long range, thereby penalising the reactivity of SGCA.

To benefit from the mass of data coming from these captors, the most relevant data will be grouped together in a combat cloud to be shared by all platforms, thus giving an informational advantage over the adversary. The multi-level communications server intended to be integrated into the F4 standard will channel information flows, distribute information as needed and ensure security of communication. For the F5 standard, already in the definition phase, data exchange will be even more secure.

Integration of AI in the future standards of Rafale is another essential step in the direction of collaborative combat. It will allow the automation of certain time-consuming tasks of information handling and network management currently performed by personnel. AI in captors will perform image interpretation to make possible real time merging and exploitation of all available data. The power of the algorithms used will simplify the aircrews’ decision-making process by presenting analysed options via a virtual assistant, in turn increasing the agility and reactivity of the air combat system.

To the fight the growing cyber threat the Rafale will be fitted with a specific, inviolable on-board digital architecture.

For all these reasons deployment of the F4 standard is necessarily ambitious and will lead to the broadest possible update of this combat aircraft so that France remains a front-line player, able to follow developments in the threat until the entry into service after 2030 of the following standard.

A necessary development in armament

Another element of collaborative combat necessary for the recapture of contested areas is a capability to saturate the adverse system by sheer numbers using intelligent weapons that cooperate amongst themselves. Their connectivity will mean they can operate autonomously in packs, or swarms, yet be synchronised in the face of the threat, able to change trajectory simultaneously, and play on dispersal in airspace then rapid concentration onto a target area to surprise and saturate defences then reach the designated targets according to the priorities set.

At the same time, there will be far greater resort to autonomy when employing them: modes of automatic target detection and reconnaissance will mean possible targets to engage will be transmitted back to aircrew and the virtual assistant will propose the best choice of engagement as a function of measurable criteria whilst leaving the aircrew the final decision to engage. The pilot will always remain in the loop when engaging a target.

Connectivity and autonomy are therefore two major paths for progress in developing air-ground weapon systems and ensuring strong penetration capability. In a highly contested environment the saturation effect will require the use of a considerable number of munitions, given that some of them will be intercepted. Connectivity and autonomy must therefore be developed according to need to keep costs to a level consistent with the concept of employment whilst allowing the forces to generate sufficient stocks. Therein lies the challenge for future developments related to the future air-to-ground weapon (Armement air-sol du future—AASF). This programme will set in motion a new approach to operating in swarms to surpass the performance currently achieved and will provide the forces with an initial SEAD-DEAD⁽³⁾ capability that is essential for acting in a highly contested environment. AASF will capitalise on technological developments that afford the ability to counter an adversary’s Navwar⁽⁴⁾ assets and will be required to ensure coherence of action between the very long-range strike made possible by the future generation of cruise missiles (the FMAN-FMC programme)⁽⁵⁾ and the strike at just a few tens of kilometres that exists today. These developments require work on the links from aircraft to munitions and between munitions, on increasing useful ranges, on the variety of military effects on offer and on-board intelligence to achieve the desired saturation effects.

These developments in connectivity will allow particular tasks to be assigned to certain munitions or sub-systems to aid the SGCA: decoys, remotely carried consumable effectors which could conduct reconnaissance or offensive jamming tasks to enhance the agility of the system and the penetration capability of vehicles such as munitions committed to the final engagement.

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The whole range of technological building blocks needed for reinforcing collaborative combat have therefore to be developed on Rafale over the coming decade if they are to be proved operationally and have future updates prepared before their integration into FCAS. The Rafale F4 constitutes a first stage of a revolution which will shape the air combat system of tomorrow. But success will only be achieved if connectivity genuinely leads to linking all players together. That is the whole point of the Air Force’s Connect@Aéro initiative.

Beyond the necessary development of collaborative combat, gaining air superiority in future confrontations will be a strategic challenge by virtue of the influence it brings—witness the skirmishes seen in the air over Syria, harbingers of violent engagements. Furthermore, the notion of attrition could return, albeit rather forgotten for the past forty years: it will require some thought on the size of combat fleets in an ever more unstable strategic environment.

(1) Florence Parly, speech at Dassault Aviation in Bordeaux-Mérignac at the launch of the F4 standard, 14 January 2018 (www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/la-ministre-des-armees-lance-le-nouveau-standard-f4-du-programme-rafale).
(2) Charge utile de guerre électronique (Live on-board EW equipment—the future system to replace the Transall).
(3) Suppression of Enemy Air Defence-Destruction of Enemy Air Defences.
(4) Navigational warfare, which incorporates PNT, meaning Position-Navigation-Time.
(5) Futur missile antinavire-Futur missile de croisière (future anti-ship missile-future cruise missile).